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INTRODUCTION 
“The respect for human rights is nowadays not so much a matter of having international 
standards, but rather questions of compliance with those standards.” 
(Michelle Bachelet, Former President of Chile) 
 The Southern Cone—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay—endured some of 
the most devastating dictatorships in world history. Thirty-thousand men, women, and children 
disappeared during the Argentine dictatorship while the Chilean population faced 17 years under 
Augusto Pinochet’s commanding military rule. While 30 years have passed since the end of 
these long-lasting dictatorships, the effects linger in the lives of the victims, their family 
members, and the societies as a whole.  
 Extensive and gruesome human rights violations occurred throughout the 
institutionalized state violence during these dictatorships. Some examples include the illegal 
kidnapping and detention of individuals, physical torture, sexual abuse, psychological 
manipulation, disappearances, and executions. The abuse continues to the present day as 
countless individuals live with the perpetual mental anguish of unanswered questions regarding 
the whereabouts of loved ones and, in the case of Argentina, the lost children of those captured. 
 When the dictatorships ended in Argentina and Chile, in 1982 and 1990 respectively, the 
first civilian governments faced many challenges of confronting these abuses. As will be 
highlighted throughout this paper, the governments had drastically different approaches to this 
task as a result of varying circumstances, history, societal responses, and international pressures. 
Using Argentina and Chile as case studies, this essay will articulate such differences, propose 
and analyze certain hypotheses that might explain the distinctions, and provide a comprehensive 
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answer to the question: Why do civilian governments of newly democratic countries respond 
differently to the human rights violations that occurred during their dictatorships? 
 Newly democratic countries respond to the human rights violations that occurred during 
its past dictatorship according to a variety of factors, specifically the severity of violence during 
the dictatorial period, the type of transition to democracy, the legal status post-dictatorship, the 
power of the executive, international pressure, and the justice policies elsewhere. Therefore, this 
paper ultimately argues that countries vary in their responses as a result of differences in any one 
of these variables. This thesis also acknowledges that other factors not evaluated may also 
impact the responses of governments.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars have debated similar questions regarding how countries transition from periods 
of authoritarianism to democracy, specifically after dictatorships; the type of democracy that 
emerges; the potential paths to justice after human rights violations during these periods; and the 
influence of the international community in searching for justice. One must first understand the 
previous literature and findings of scholars in order to analyze specific cases. 
 
Type of Transitions 
 One important factor in this field of study regards the type of transition to democracy. 
Guillermo O’Donnell divided the possibilities in two: with a pact, also called a consensus, or 
without a pact referred to as by force or collapse.1 A transition by consensus implies one where 
the ruling armed forces negotiate their terms for their exit from power with the civil society and 
 
1 Daniel Mazzei, “Reflexiones sobre la transición democrática argentina,” PolHis 4, no. 7 (2011): 11. 
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political parties that will soon retake the government. Therefore, by contrast, the armed forces do 
not have this ability in a transition by collapse.  
Many scholars have expanded on this duality, discussing the implications of this division 
and what might influence which path a departing dictatorship takes. Daniel Mazzei and Carlos 
Santiago Nino emphasize the etiology, or “the types of factors that ignite the transition process,” 
as important to distinguishing the modality or which transition occurs. The etiology of a 
transition may be endogenous or exogenous depending on the factors—internal or external—that 
triggered the democratization.2 Mazzei states, “A transition by collapse is produced… after an 
external military defeat or after a profound internal crisis of the authoritarian regime,” signifying 
mainly exogenous factors.3 Scholars have discovered that transitions via consensus result in “a 
continuity of the structures, elites, and political practices of the authoritarian regimes” who can 
then help rebuild the new democracy and “direct the pace of transition and preserve the 
prerogatives they have obtained” whereas transitions by collapse result in a defeated armed 
forces with little to no power who must work within the newly created system.4 
Regarding a transition by consensus, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo discuss the 
benefits of creating a constitution to negotiate the authoritarian regime’s terms of removal. As 
mentioned above, scholars argue that a consensus transition results in minimal prosecutions 
because of the continued existence of the authoritarian elites in institutions. These authors further 
articulate this argument regarding the decreased likelihood of punishment of dictators when the 
 
2 Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996): 107. 
3 Daniel Mazzei, 11. 
4 Daniel Mazzei, 11; David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and 
Human Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile,” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 5 (October 1, 
1998): 636, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031005004; Carlos H Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, “Adjusting the 
Armed Forces to Democracy: Successes, Failures, and Ambiguities in the Southern Cone,” in Constructing 
Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, ed. Elizabth Jelin and Eric Hershberg 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 33. 
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new government inherits constitutions from the prior regime: “once a constitution is 
promulgated, the commitment to former elites’ interests can be ensured through several 
channels: over-representing holdover elites in political institutions, inducing political gridlock, 
imposing military veto power over policy, and enshrining elite dominance over local politics.”5 
This effectively prevents the former dictatorial elites from prosecution and enshrines their power 
in the new democracy, making any meaningful change to the system more difficult. 
Additionally, the role of the military in the new democracy greatly depends on the 
etiology and modality of the transition. Carlos Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz address the direct 
effect of the relative success of the military regime during the dictatorship and its role after: “the 
process of political struggle that took place before, during, and after the dictatorship determined 
the way in which the Armed Forces were eventually integrated into the democratic system.”6 
Furthermore, Charles Call discovers a deeper connection between the mode of transition and the 
internal security reforms that result. Armed forces have many incentives to remain in power such 
as to block prosecutions of its members, avoid loss of access to bribes and illicit incomes, and to 
defend itself from perceived internal threats, however; their ability to do so depends on whether 
or not the country experienced a “war transition”—a  “democratic transitions where the armed 
forces are strategically defeated by an enemy army or forced to negotiate an end to war.”7 Call 
argues for the weakening of the military as a necessary condition to introduce the broadest 
reforms to security, which most frequently occur after a war transition.8 This argument enforces 
 
5 Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, “Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of 
Outgoing Autocrats,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2014): 551, 552, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12128. 
6 Carlos H Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, 1996, 33. 
7 Charles Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 35 
(November 1, 2002): 1, https://doi.org/10.2307/4146925. 
8 Charles Call, 1, 21. 
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the transition literature as it emphasizes the complicated and negative effect of a persistent 
military presence after the dictatorship ends without transition by collapse. 
Further, David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux articulate another way to analyze the 
effects of the different modes of transition. They believe a complete understanding of the 
transitions and the governments’ responses cannot exist without analyzing the institutional 
arrangements that remain. The relative concentration of decision-making authority combined 
with the relative autonomy of decision-makers from opposition pressure will determine the 
success of the justice programs. The higher the concentration of decision-making authority—“the 
number of actors/units involved in formulating and implementing policy”—the more a single-
actor can impose his or her preferences, specifically regarding transitional justice policies, and 
the less likely a manipulative opportunity arises for the military to counteract such efforts, 
meaning the decision-maker can avert the negative effects of decentralized power.9 Decision-
making autonomy refers to “an institution’s capacity to act independently by insulating itself 
from unwanted, external pressures,” specifically from the armed forces.10 An institution with 
autonomy can more easily protect itself from military opponents. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
matrix through which Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux analyze the relative authority and autonomy to 
determine the success of policies and effectiveness of military intervention.  
 
9 David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, 640. 
10 David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, 640. 
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Figure 1: Policy outcomes and institutional design (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux) 
 Moreover, power-balance theory expands on the type of transition distinction and its 
effect on prosecutions. This theory determines the occurrence—and success—of trials as a result 
of the “balance of power that exists between the old and new elites immediately after a 
transition.”11 Accordingly, the theory proposes that transitions with a pact will have less success 
than those that collapsed—and even less than regimes ousted by force—as a result of the change 
in and level of coerciveness of the new government, diminished strength of previously powerful 
elites, removal of the past-regime from dominance, acceptance of accountability by the new 
government, and the ability to make substantial alterations to the country.12 In a 2012 study, Hun 
Joon Kim finds that the power balance between old and new elites does not generally affect a 
 
11 Hun Joon Kim, “Structural Determinants of Human Rights Prosecutions after Democratic Transition,” Journal of 
Peace Research 49, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 307, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311431600. 
12 Carlos Santiago Nino, 118, 119; Daniel Mazzei, 13; Hun Joon Kim, 307; Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim, 
“The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations,” Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science 9, no. 1 (2013): 277, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102612-133956. 
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state’s decision to prosecute human rights trials; however, he discovered that countries that 
experienced a transition by collapse were 2.4 times more likely to use prosecutions, only in the 
first four years after the transition, than countries that did not face a ruptured transition.13  
 
Democracy 
The term “transition to democracy” emphasizes the end goal: democracy. Manfred 
Schmidt accurately states “‘Democracy’ is the collective term for a wide variety of regimes,” 
meaning many definitions and typographies exist.14 Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of 
democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” can only begin to 
define this term.  
Scholar Robert Dahl considers the defining feature of a democracy as “the quality of 
being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens,” whom he considers as 
political equals.15 Therefore, its citizens must have the uninhibited ability to “1) formulate their 
preferences, 2) signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual 
and collective action, and 3) have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the 
government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the 
preference.”16 Table 1 defines the institutional guarantees that Dahl articulates that align with the 
three opportunities.  
 
 
 
13 Hun Joon Kim, 312. 
14 Manfred G. Schmidt, “Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Comparative Studies,” 
European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 1 (2002): 147, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00007. 
15 Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press, 1973): 2. 
16 Robert Alan Dahl, 2. 
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Table 1: Some Requirements for a Democracy among a Large Number of People (Dahl) 
For the opportunity to: The following institutional guarantees are 
required: 
I. Formulate preferences 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Right of political leaders to compete for 
support 
5. Alternative sources of information 
II. Signify preferences 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for 
support 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
III. Have preferences weighted equally in 
conduct of government 
1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for 
support 
a. Right of political leaders to 
compete for votes 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
8. Institutions for making government 
policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference 
 
Using these indicators, Dahl categorizes regimes using two dimensions: public contestation and 
inclusiveness (or electoral participation), see Figure 2. Dahl describes an exclusive regime with 
little opportunity for contestation as a closed hegemony.17 Should a regime liberalize and move 
along path one to more contestation, it becomes a competitive oligarchy whereas moving along 
 
17 Robert Alan Dahl, 7. 
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path two increases the popularization of the regime and develops into an inclusive hegemony.18 
According to Dahl, a regime becomes closest to a democracy with full inclusiveness and full 
public contestation; however, he uses the term “polyarchy” to avoid over-generalizing as he 
understands other factors contribute to this democratic designation.19 This categorization of 
democracy by Dahl forms the basis of many other definitions as it outlines democratic norms and 
how to evaluate them. 
 
Figure 2: Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization (Dahl) 
Other scholars have based their definitions of democracy on that of Dahl. Mike Alvarez, 
et al. take a minimalist approach in defining democracy: “a regime in which some governmental 
offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections.”20 Contestation implies that the 
opposition has some chance of winning office in an election and has three features: 1) ex ante 
uncertainty—some positive probability that at least one incumbent can lose in an election cycle, 
2) ex post irreversibility—the winner of an election will assume office, and 3) repeatability.21 
Alvarez et al. define a regime as a democracy if the people elect the chief executive and the 
 
18 Robert Alan Dahl, 7. 
19 Robert Alan Dahl, 8. 
20 Mike Alvarez et al., “Classifying Political Regimes,” Studies In Comparative International Development 31, no. 2 
(June 1996): 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02719326. 
21 Mike Alvarez et al., 5-6. 
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legislature and if more than one party exists.22 Further, Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 
pose a narrower yet still minimalist definition of democracy: “a regime (1) that sponsors free and 
fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (2) that allows for inclusive adult 
citizenship; (3) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (4) in which the elected 
governments really govern and the military is under civilian control.”23 This definition of 
democracy aligns more so with Dahl because it requires more of a regime to not only have 
political contestation but also provide certain rights and be free of military pressure. Acuña and 
Smulovitz pose a third definition using an intermediate approach evaluating “the degree and 
scope (maintenance/variation) of military prerogatives” and “the degree and level of military 
contestation of civilian decisions,” categorizing regimes as democratic if they have low or 
middle levels of military prerogatives and low levels of military contestation.24 This definition 
approaches democracy more so in terms of the presence, or lack thereof, of the military, a 
different yet related approach to that of Dahl. 
Arend Lijphart thus defines democracy using the words of Abraham Lincoln as 
“government by the people or, in representative democracy, government by the representatives 
of the people” and “government in accordance with the people’s preferences.”25 Using this 
definition he articulates two distinct types of democracy that answer the pivotal questions, “Who 
will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive when the 
people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?”26 The first type titled the 
 
22 Mike Alvarez et al., 7-8. 
23 Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America 1945-
1999,” Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 1 (March 2001): 38, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687584. 
24 Carlos H Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, 34. 
25 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Second 
Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012): 1. 
26 Arend Lijphart, 2. 
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Westminster or majoritarian model answers this question promoting the majority’s wishes while 
the consensus model, his second category, advocates for as many people as possible.27 Lijphart 
differentiates the two types on a basis of 10 indicators. Table 2 demonstrates the differences 
between the majoritarian and consensus democracies. 
Table 2: Classifications of the Majoritarian/Westminster and Consensus Models of Democracy (Lijphart) 
Majoritarian/ Westminster Consensus 
High concentration of executive power in 
one-party and bare-majority cabinets 
Executive power-sharing in broad coalition 
cabinets 
Cabinet dominance Executive-legislative balance of power 
Two-party system Multiparty system 
Majoritarian and disproportional system of 
elections 
Proportional representation 
Interest group pluralism Interest group corporatism 
Unitary and centralized government Federal and decentralized government 
Concentration of legislative power in a 
unicameral legislature 
Strong bicameralism 
Constitutional flexibility Constitutional rigidity 
Absence of judicial review Judicial review 
Central bank controlled by the executive Central bank independence 
 
Scholars have debated the efficacy and strength of the comparative regimes for decades. 
Before World War II, scholars viewed majoritarian democracies “as more stable, fitter for 
survival even under adverse circumstances…, and better at problem solving;” however, this 
belief has switched in the 1970s with more arguing for the comparative strength of consensus 
democracies, specifically in “softer” political issues.28 
Many scholars have extrapolated on the majoritarian-consensus typography and applied it 
to specific regions or circumstances, including Kestler et al. who operationalize the distinction in 
Latin America. Using five of the 10 measures—party systems, concentration of executive power, 
 
27 Arend Lijphart, 2. 
28 Manfred G. Schmidt, 148–49. 
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executive-legislative relations, electoral systems and interest groups—the authors evaluate the 
practices in 10 Latin American countries to determine the type of democracy. They discover less 
stability in institutional patterns in their sample than Lijphart’s original findings, which they 
contribute to the impact of informal institutions due to increased clientelism. Including 
informality into the analyses, Kestler et al. find that countries have progressively adopted more 
majoritarian patterns.29  
Despite some differences, all of the definitions above imply a representative democracy. 
O’Donnell defines another type of democracy—delegative democracies—as those who fit Dahl’s 
criteria for a polyarchy and have persisted however have not secured themselves as 
representative democracies as a result of “neither institutional progress nor much governmental 
effectiveness in dealing with their respective social and economic crises.”30 Representative 
democracies have engrained institutions that “provide a crucial level of mediation and 
aggregation between, on one side, structural factors and, on the other, not only individuals but 
also the diverse groupings under which society organizes its multiple interests and identities” 
whereas delegative democracies “rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the 
presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of 
existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office.”31 In other words, a 
representative democracy has certain institutional parameters that have developed over time that 
do not yet exist in a delegative democracy. O’Donnell describes delegative democracies as 
“strongly” majoritarian and individualistic however with “weak institutionalization and, at best, 
 
29 Thomas Kestler, Juan Bautista Lucca, and Silvana Krause, “‘Break-In Parties’ and Changing Patterns of 
Democracy in Latin America,” Brazilian Political Science Review 10, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-
38212016000100004. 
30 Guillermo A O’Donell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 56, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0010. 
31 Guillermo A O’Donell, 59. 
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is indifferent toward strengthening it.”32 This new categorization of democracy tends to emerge 
after transitions, which O’Donnell found in Latin America and other post-communist, Asian, and 
African countries. 
Another classification for democracy depends on the selection manner of the executive 
and legislative and how the two bodies interact to form policy. Parliamentarism and 
presidentialism represent the two main classifications. In a parliamentary system, the executive 
“is selected by the assembly” and “remains in office subject to legislative confidence” whereas 
the “chief executive is popularly elected; the terms of the chief executive and of the assembly are 
fixed, and not subject to mutual confidence; [and] the elected executive names and directs the 
composition of the government and has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority” in a 
presidential system.33 John Carey states that the root of distinction between the two system 
predicates on the origin and survival of these two branches: parliamentarism usually results in 
fused powers where the executive and assembly have power to dissolve the other based on 
mutual dependence while the two branches under presidentialism have distinct electoral 
processes.34 Carey defines hybrid regimes as the third category where “the president is popularly 
elected, and is endowed with meaningful powers [and] there also exists a prime minister and 
cabinet, subject to assembly confidence.”35 Hybrid regimes can exist along a spectrum between 
presidentialism and parliamentarism.  
Many scholars have evaluated and compared the two dominant systems attempting to 
determine which regime type has most success and, within the context of the plethora of newly 
 
32 Guillermo A O’Donell, 60, 62. 
33 John M. Carey, “Presidential versus Parliamentary Government,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 
ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 91. 
34 John M. Carey, 92. 
35 John M. Carey, 92. 
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democratic states in the 1980s and 1990s, has less risk of breakdown. Scholars, namely Juan 
Linz, argued that parliamentarism provides democratic stability in ways not present in 
presidentialism as well as advocated for the democratic norms such as voter participation and 
protection of minorities.36 However, the actions of the newly democratic regimes in Latin 
America and around the world do not fully represent the scholars’ optimistic view of 
parliamentarism. According to Carey, a majority of the countries maintained a powerfully, 
elected president; however, they granted assemblies with substantial confidence authority over 
some part of the executive.37 The distinction of parliamentarism and presidentialism then 
possibly affects the longevity of democracy. 
Furthermore, Manuel Garretón discusses ways to approach democratic consolidation. He 
argues that a state must address the authoritarian enclaves in order to complete its transition. The 
new regimes inherit four enclaves from its dictatorial predecessors: 1) human rights violations; 
2) an institutional legacy of democratic norms that limit democratic practices; 3) political actors, 
organizations, and social sectors linked to the military; and 4) a generalized presence of 
antidemocratic or authoritarian values, mentalities, and attitudes.38 Therefore, the governments 
must determine an approach to treat these authoritarian enclaves comprehensively in order to 
develop into a democratic regime. Garretón outlines two logics that regimes can adopt to address 
these issues: 1) ethical-symbolic logic, which advocates for the reconstitution of the situation that 
existed prior and demands truth, the dissemination of information about the crimes, trials and 
punishments of those responsible, and reparations for the victims and 2) politico-statist logic 
 
36 John M. Carey, 94; Manfred G. Schmidt, 154. 
37 John M. Carey, 97. 
38 Manuel Antonio Garretón, “Human Rights in Democratization Processes,” in Constructing Democracy: Human 
Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, ed. Elizabth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1996), 40. 
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which searches for the maintenance of a democratic regime that inherently resolves the human 
rights issue and prevents similar ones in the future.39 Following the multiple definitions of 
democracy and its types, Garretón proposes that states must first repair themselves from the 
effects of the dictatorial regimes before reaching democracy status. 
 
Transitional Justice 
Another definition necessary to evaluate the differences between the two countries’ 
responses relates to the study of transitional justice. The use of “transition to democracy” to 
describe the ending of an authoritarian regime as opposed to “regime change” or “transfers of 
power” emphasizes the stated goal of democratic reform; the end of modernization theories that 
heavily focused on socioeconomic conditions; a reformation of the formerly Marxist term 
“transition” once connoting social reform to a focus on political reform; and a decline of the 
radical Left in favor of increased human rights norms.40 This term also expresses its goal of 
“some measure of justice for victims of state crimes.”41 Transitional justice has become a widely 
popular field of study regarding the process of consolidating democracy after authoritarianism, 
especially during the third wave of democratization. Accordingly, Paul van Zyl, the Executive 
Secretary of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, declared transitional justice 
“an attempt to build a sustainable peace after conflict, mass violence, or systemic human rights 
abuse,”42 and José Zalaquett, a prominent human rights lawyer and former adviser to Chilean 
President Patricio Aylwin, emphasized the need of transitional justice to put the “existing moral 
 
39 Manuel Antonio Garretón, 41. 
40 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 337-340, https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069. 
41 Melissa Nobles, “The Prosecution of Human Rights Violations,” Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 
(2010): 166, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.040108.110013. 
42 Paul van Zyl, “Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies,” in Transitional Justice: Handbook for 
Latin America, ed. Félix Reátegui (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011), 45. 
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order…back in place.”43 While scholars contemplate the origins of transitional justice, most 
agree on the definition as measures undertaken by emerging democracies.44 Accordingly, 
transitional justice serves two main purposes: “to respond to the experiences of suffering of the 
past; and to prevent similar suffering in the future” through prosecutions, reparations, 
reformations to institutions, truth, and reconciliation.45 This large field has subsections within 
that address its goals and effects, specifically the importance of the rule of law, transitional 
advocacy networks, diffusion theory, and the resulting justice cascade. 
The rule of law presents as a long-term goal of transitional justice. It requires the 
actionable limiting of government and the acknowledgment on part of the executive of the 
binding nature of the law as well as implies accountability and an existing social contract. Pilar 
Domingo states, “The degree of rule of law to some extent is a measure of the degree to which 
states live up to the promises of the bill of rights.”46 The judiciary comprises a pivotal role in 
transitional justice. Legitimate prosecutions rely on an unbiased, impartial, and fair judiciary to 
arrive at the truth and determine the culpability of all those involved. Scholars have found that 
judicial reforms focusing on strengthening the rule of law—specifically judicial independence 
and the establishment of judicial council—have successfully swept through Latin America. 
 
43 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The Need for Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights Violations: An 
Interview with José Zalaquett,” in Transitional Justice: Handbook for Latin America, ed. Félix Reátegui (New 
York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011), 164. 
44 Paige Arthur, 331. 
45 Paul van Zyl, 45. 
Pilar Domingo, “Accountability, the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Latin America,” in After Oppression: 
Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano (Tokyo, 
Japan: United Nations University Press, 2012): 45. 
46 Pilar Domingo, 43. 
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Further, de facto judicial independence has shown to result in more respect for human rights, 
specifically physical integrity rights.47 
The legal status, as argued by Nino, follows as an important component of the rule of law 
and transitional justice. A continuous legal status means “a new legal system emerges from the 
old one, adhering to preexisting rules for the creation of new laws” whereas “democracy is 
founded on an entirely new constitution with no link to the old legal system” in a ruptured 
transition.48 A third possibility exists as well: restoration—“the new democracy is found on an 
old constitution, once in force but suspended or abrogated by the authoritarian regime.”49 
Logically, Nino emphasizes the increasing levels of difficulty for justice, with legal rupture as 
the smoothest, restoration with an intermediate degree of difficulty, and the continuous transition 
most difficult.50 The maintenance of certain judicial features, specifically lack of judicial 
independence or existence of biased judges from the authoritarian regime inhibit democratic 
progress and the ability to adequately prosecute perpetrators of human rights. 
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) comprise another component of transitional 
justice where individuals from domestic and international nongovernmental organizations, civil 
society groups, and international organizations collaborate on specific issues to promote ideas, 
norms, and policies, specifically trials. Kim’s study finds, “a state with strong domestic and 
international organizations advocating human rights and individual criminal accountability is 
likely to use human rights prosecutions more frequently and persistently.”51 Domestic advocacy 
increases the likelihood of prosecutions by 4.3 times and international pressure increases it by 
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2.4 times; however, when international and domestic pressures combine, he finds countries 10 
times more likely to prosecute.52 Interestingly, he finds that domestic advocacy fuels high-level 
prosecutions whereas international pressure largely influences low-level prosecutions.53 The 
TANs also exist as the pillar of the boomerang model, outlined by Keck and Sikkink, whereby 
members of a state bypass their own government and appeal to regional NGOs and TANs to 
pressure their state to make the desired human rights changes.  
 Transitional justice also includes diffusion theory. According to Kim, “diffusion occurs 
when the decision to proceed with a human rights prosecution in one country is influenced by 
previous choices of other countries with an authoritarian past.”54 The diffusion could occur 
simply due to geographic proximity and/or through cultural similarity. Kim finds, “a state is 
more likely to initiate and repeatedly use human rights prosecutions if similar prosecutions had 
already been used by its neighbors,” with more success with diffusion through cultural similarity 
(four times greater) than solely geographic proximity.55 Language and religion present the most 
common shared cultural factors that influence diffusion.56  
Kathryn Sikkink discovered the justice cascade or the “rapid and dramatic shift in the 
legitimacy of the norms of individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and an 
increase in actions (such as trials) on behalf of such norms.”57 The practices and norms of 
transitional justice have dramatically increased and spread globally. Kim and Sikkink describe 
the spread as the “outward and upward [transmission] through horizontal diffusion from one 
country to another and then via bottom-up vertical diffusion from individual countries to 
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intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs.”58 The cascade relies on TANs who 
“pioneered the strategies, developed the legal arguments, often recruited the plaintiffs and/or 
witnesses, marshaled the evidence, and persevered through years of legal challenges” as well as 
worked globally to spread the efforts and pressure the countries to change.59 Lutz and Sikkink 
acknowledge that the efforts of the TANs had success as a result of the shift in norms to 
understand and protect human rights, especially those against torture and disappearance and for 
democratic governance.60 Many scholars argue that the justice cascade expanded as a result of 
the actions in Latin America, specifically Argentina.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
This paper proposes various hypotheses based off the research of other academics in this 
field of transitional justice:  
1) higher levels of atrocities and abuses will be more motivating to justice and 
accountability than lower levels;  
2) internal and external factors that result in a transition by collapse will result in more 
immediate actions for justice than factors that end in a consensus transition; 
3) a country with a continuous legal structure, and therefore, closed judiciary, will have 
a slower justice process than those with a ruptured or restored system with less 
dictatorial influence on the judicial branch;  
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4) higher levels of decision-making autonomy and authority of the president will result 
in greater success of transitional justice policy outcomes than those with lower levels 
of either;  
5) greater levels of international pressure, stemming from transnational advocacy 
networks, will incentivize domestic action more so than in cases without such 
pressure; and  
6) countries geographically proximate and/or culturally similar to another country with 
transitional justice policies will be influenced more than those not such connected. 
The severity and quantity of human rights abuses could potentially affect the search for 
justice as a result of the moral contentions and emotions that arise. Nino states, “the more 
heinous the human rights abuses, the more likely that the attempt to punish them will succeed.”61 
This seems likely as people tend to believe murderers and torturers deserve repercussions. 
Further, the higher number of people tortured or killed will directly impact the amount of people 
affected and, therefore, the number of individuals searching and fighting for justice. As 
Argentina and Chile had some of the worst torture practices during their respective dictatorships, 
this hypothesis would explain why both countries had trials to prosecute those responsible for the 
grave human rights abuses that occurred. 
The second hypothesis relates to the discussion of etiology and modality analyzed by 
many scholars. This paper determines that the etiology effects the modality, which influences the 
responses to the human rights violations. Chile represents an example of an authoritarian regime 
that ended due to endogenous factors: the 1988 plebiscite called for by Pinochet’s 1980 
Constitution. This resulted in a pacted transition to democracy, meaning the military would still 
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maintain a certain degree of power after leaving. Even though Pinochet lost the vote in 1988, he 
remained the Commander in Chief of the Army and retained many of his political powers as 
well. On the other hand, the economic crisis, the increase in number and strength of the human 
rights social movements, the division within the armed forces, and the military loss in the 
Falkland Islands represent the endogenous and exogenous factors that led to the Argentine 
Junta’s failure. The Argentine case, therefore, represents a transition by collapse. As stated by 
Carlos Santiago Nino, “The collapse of the Argentine military regime, triggered both by external 
and internal factors, created in its wake a certain balance of power which was partially 
determinative of the course of retroactive justice.”62 As the Junta lost its power, it did not have 
the same benefits as seen by Pinochet in Chile. This paper argues that the difference in factors 
that resulted in the transition and the mode itself greatly impacts the ability for justice—with 
those by collapse more likely to adopt transitional justice policies— at least in the short run. 
Accordingly, Argentina’s collapse made the response for justice much quicker than that of Chile. 
 As an effect of the type of transition, this paper suggests that the legal status also impacts 
the likelihood of prosecutions. Due to the terms of the 1988 plebiscite and transitional 
negotiations, the Chilean judicial system and judges remained closely tied to the Pinochet 
regimes—an example of a continuous legal status. Argentina, however, presents as an example 
of legal restoration. The country reinstated its original Constitution; however, policies enacted by 
the authoritarian regime also remained. Article 18 of the 1853 Constitution prohibit ex post facto 
criminal legislation and when combined with article 2 of the Penal Code that states that the 
defendant must receive the most favorable law to them, the self-amnesty law of the dictatorship 
appeared to protect the regime.63 The availability of the judicial system can, therefore, determine 
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the judicial system as a path for transitional justice. As the judicial system in Chile remained 
heavily influence by Pinochet influence beginning years of the transition, prosecutions had a 
considerably smaller chance of success than in Argentina. 
 Similarly, the availability of institutions remains important to enact transitional justice 
policies. Following the argument of Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, an executive with high decision-
making autonomy and a high concentration of authority will have a greater opportunity to 
promote such policies. According to the authors, Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, had high 
decision-making autonomy but a low concentration of authority as the judiciary system had high 
levels of independence, making for moderate success in Alfonsín’s policies.64 President Patricio 
Aylwin of Chile had mixed success in his two part plan as he had high levels of autonomy and 
authority for his first phase of an inquest into the abuses but for his second phase of naming the 
abuses, he relied on the judiciary and Congress who still had strong ties to Pinochet.65 This paper 
indicates that the autonomy and authority of the executive hold importance for the success of 
justice policies. 
 International pressure greatly influences the actions of states. Many scholars emphasize 
the role of TANs in incentivizing prosecutions of human rights abusers. This paper argues that 
international organizations and their actions, specifically those of TANs, will influence the 
specified states to act in favor of transitional justice policies. The paper further assumes the 
importance of nationals abroad in truth bearing and motivating TANs to pressure the states. 
Specifically, the acts of Spain and England forced Chile to evaluate their actions, or lack thereof, 
regarding transitional justice and criminal trials. Further, the protests in London and Chilean 
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communities abroad collaborated to bring awareness of the demands and desires for justice that 
the Chilean government could no longer ignore.66 
 Lastly, this paper considers the diffusion theory as highly motivational for transitional 
countries to pursue criminal trials. As stated above, Kim discovered that countries geographically 
close and culturally similar will be influenced by the actions of other states. Latin America, a 
largely Spanish-speaking and Catholic region, would therefore seem the most likely region to 
have trials as a result of diffusion. As the two case study countries share geographical proximity 
as well as similar language, religion, and culture, this paper assumes a connection. With the 
Chilean process occurring after the Argentine, this paper considers the diffusion theory and the 
effect that the trials in Argentina had on the latter case. 
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METHODS 
“Everything I did, all my actions, all of the problems I had I dedicate to God and to Chile, 
because I kept Chile from becoming Communist.”  
(Augusto Pinochet, Former Dictator of Chile)  
 This thesis utilizes a comparative case study analysis of two countries—Argentina and 
Chile—with many similarities yet startling differences to understand on a broader level what 
results in differing responses to the human rights violations that occur during dictatorships. 
Following the hypotheses set forth earlier in the essay, the analysis will focus on certain 
variables that operationalize the premises and allow for the requisite comprehensive analysis. 
 First, the paper must articulate the periods of dictatorship, transition to democracy, and 
resulting government. Many data projects have analyzed periods of democracy and 
authoritarianism. Freedom House classifies countries as free, partly free, or not free depending 
on the presence and degree of political rights and civil liberties.67 The Polity IV Project analyzes 
democracy and autocracy to create a polity score. Polity IV has a three-part definition for 
institutionalized democracy: 1) “the presence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders,” 2) “the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive,” and 3) “the 
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation.”68 Countries receive a score from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (democracy). Similarly, 
autocracy, the “restrict[ion] or suppress[ion of] competitive political participation,” has a 0 (not 
autocratic) to 10 (autocratic) range. The Polity2 score combines these two variables to determine 
 
67 Freedom in the World, “Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses, 1973-2019” (Freedom House, 2019), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. 
68 Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-
2018,” Polity IV Project (Center for Systemic Peace, 2019), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
  
Drucker 28 
the level of autocracy or democracy in a given country, ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 
10 (strongly democratic). Additionally, the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset defines 
democracy as the presence of certain variables such as effective executive and legislative 
elections, a closed legislature, and the legality and presence of multiple parties.69 If a country 
receives certain scores on these measures, they classify the country as a democracy. The 
Transitional Justice Research Collaborative (TJRC) also codified countries as democratic or 
autocratic. 
 Further, many of the hypotheses consider the amount of justice; therefore, this paper must 
operationalize this term. This thesis considers justice as the presence of human rights trials, 
especially considering both studied countries had at least one truth and reconciliation 
commission. Country reports publicize data on prosecutions, which this paper will consider. 
Also, the TJRC measured prosecutions and verdicts of the countries and regions as well as guilty 
verdicts. The first TJRC variable measures the number of prosecutions in a given year while 
another adds the prosecutions of previous years to arrive at a lagged sum. A lagged sum also 
exists for the number of guilty verdicts. This paper will analyze the data from TJRC to determine 
as well as the information from the country reports to measure the degree of justice in each 
country over time.  
The first hypothesis discusses the heinousness of human rights violations. The 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project examined such information, evaluating 
countries’ behaviors regarding extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political 
imprisonment, culminating in an overall physical integrity rights index.70 According to the 
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prevalence of such actions, countries receive a 0 for the frequent practice (50 or more), 1 for 
occasional practice (1-49), and 2 for no practice or unreported.71 The physical integrity rights 
index combines the scores of these four indicators and scores countries from 0 (no government 
respect) to 8 (full government respect).72 Keith Schnakenberg and Christopher J. Fariss created 
another system—Latent Human Rights Protection—to evaluate respect for human rights, 
especially physical integrity rights. These scores represent standard deviations from zero (5.4 to -
3.8), with the higher numbers signifying more protections for these rights. The Political Terror 
Scale (PTS) codifies information from human rights reports from Amnesty International, the 
U.S. State Department, and Human Rights Watch and analyzes such data based on a 5-level 
terror scale from 1, which means “torture is rare or exceptional,” to 5, which signifies that “terror 
has expanded to the whole population”—a score of 0 means data not available.73 Further, this 
thesis will also examine the reports issued regarding such topics, including Nunca Más (Never 
Again), the Rettig Report, and the Valech Report. 
 The second hypothesis relies on the history of the countries, examining the internal and 
external factors that led to the transition. This paper trusts scholarly analysis of such 
unquantifiable actions.  
 Next, the third hypothesis analyzes the legal/judicial structure of the country. This 
requires an analysis of the availability of the legal system to trials of perpetrators from the prior 
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dictatorship. Therefore, the paper will evaluate measures of judicial independence to determine 
the accessibility of the judicial system. CIRI codes states in terms of the “extent to which the 
judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government 
or military”: 0= not independent, 1=partially independent, and 2=generally independent.74 
Another measure of judicial independence comes from Linda Camp Keith and scores countries 
identically to CIRI’s dataset. 75 Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey K. Stanton have another dataset that 
measures de facto judicial independence, which scores countries from 0 to 1, with 1 representing 
higher levels of judicial independence.76 
 The next hypothesis compares the autonomy and authority of the president to gauge the 
ability to execute transitional justice policies. This hypothesis builds on the prior one, as the 
structure and independence of the judiciary will impact that of the executive. Further, this paper 
will analyze the executive constraints measure of the Polity IV dataset. This measure “refers to 
the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives.”77 
“Accountability groups”—advisors in monarchies, the military, an independent judiciary—may 
impose such limitations on the executive. The score ranges from 1—unlimited authority—to 7—
executive parity or subordination.78 This score, however, does not articulate the type of 
accountability group, meaning the score cannot explain the pressures facing the executive. For 
example, the legacy of a dictator in the legislative or judiciary does not differ from an equally 
powerful yet balanced and democratic legislature. Therefore, this paper considers the types of 
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groups exerting constraints and whether or not these constraints occur organically as in a 
democracy or remain from as a post-dictatorial regime. 
 International pressure exists in many forms; however, this paper focuses on pressure from 
individuals and transnational advocacy networks. Exiles from Argentina and Chile formed strong 
groups that actively opposed the dictatorships and demanded justice. Further, the efforts of the 
Spanish government and judicial system to prosecute Pinochet using universal jurisdiction 
contributes to the international pressure studied in this paper. This thesis also analyzes reports 
from international organizations. These organizations such as the United Nations (General 
Assembly, Security Council, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights work with smaller non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations as part of 
TANs. Reports and resolutions by these international organizations will emphasize the degree of 
the presence of TANs and their responses to the actions of the dictatorships and civilian 
governments. 
  The last hypothesis following diffusion theory relies on statistical information of 
transitional justice policies enacted in geographically proximate or culturally similar countries. 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, Argentina and Chile—neighbors in South America—have 
many cultural similarities and as Argentina transitioned before Chile, my last hypothesis would 
posit that Argentina influenced Chile if the former had trials and prosecutions. Along with the 
prosecutions data from TJRC, the Collaborative also recorded the percentage of countries in a 
region that experienced prosecutions in a given year. This paper will use the data compiled by 
the TJRC and other in-state reports to evaluate the existence of prosecutions and guilty verdicts 
to determine the validity of the diffusion theory.  
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CASES 
 Many countries have undergone transitions to democracy in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries, meaning many possible examples exist to examine the question proposed in this thesis. 
However, this paper will compare and contrast Argentina and Chile. The many cultural, 
historical, and geographical similarities of these two countries allow for a specified analysis of 
the post-dictatorial governments’ responses and, therefore, make strong case studies. 
 Argentina and Chile belong to the same geographical region of the Southern Cone. These 
countries also share similar cultural practices and historical roots. Further, all of the Southern 
Cone countries suffered coup d’états by military groups around the 1970s, resulting in 
devastating institutional military dictatorships. Among the entire region, the dictators believed in 
the Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional (DSN)—Doctrine of National Security—which articulated a 
fight against the threat of communism and defined the “ideological frontiers” and “internal 
enemy” to which the dictatorships must fight against to protect their countries.79 This common 
construction and ideology among all of the dictators aligned with that of the United States. The 
United States played a large role in instituting and maintaining the dictatorships in the Southern 
Cone, especially within the Cold War context that cemented the anti-communist directive. 
The overlap in timing and interests intersects with the Plan Condor that unified the 
dictatorial regimes of the region. The Chilean secret police, the Dirección de Inteligencia 
Nacional—Directorate of National Intelligence—(DINA), spearheaded the effort to collaborate 
with the other military powers in the region as well as the United States to share information 
about insurgent individuals and groups, facilitate the capture of political prisoners who had 
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escaped their countries of origin to neighboring countries, and organize operations against the 
political enemies.80 Plan Condor ensured similar actions be taken by all regimes, contributing to 
the mass human rights violations that occurred throughout the region. 
Despite all of these similarities between Argentina and Chile, they had a variety of 
differences as well. The Argentine regime named itself the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional 
(Proceso)—Process of National Reorganization—which lasted from 1976 to 1983 and had four 
presidents: General Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-1980), General Roberto Eduardo Viola (1980-
1981), General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri (1981-1982) and General Reynaldo Bignone (1982-
1983). On the other hand, General Augusto Pinochet had control over Chile from the coup d’état 
on September 11, 1973 until the end in 1990. Further, scholars have found that the Argentine 
economy collapsed while the Chilean economy thrived under the Chicago Boys’ libertarian 
policies. This influenced public attitudes toward the regimes which impacted the relative success 
and permanence of the dictators. The details and timelines of each country will help in the 
understanding of the actions of each country during their transitions to democracy and in the 
years that followed as well as provide the basis for the data analysis in the following chapter. 
 
Argentina 
 On March 24, 1976, the armed forces overthrew the democratic government of María 
Estela Martínez de Perón, beginning the reign of the Military Junta. The armed forces in 
Argentina had decided to share the power, granting each of the three sectors—army, navy, and 
air force—equal control and different responsibilities. This division attempted to appease any 
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potential intra-military conflict.81 Aligning with the DNS, the Junta relied on inflicting fear and 
terror into the country and had decided that “repression of terrorism was to be clandestine.”82 
Each sector of the armed forces had assigned its own groups of individuals in charge of the 
torture centers with full autonomy to “detain, torture, and decide the destiny of the prisoners.”83 
State-run terrorism dominated the country as countless individuals suffered torture in secret, 
defining the first phase of the Argentine dictatorship of “violently subordinat[ing] society to state 
control.”84 
 El Proceso also implemented a new neoliberal economic system, similar to that of the 
Chicago Boys in Chile. This shift along with other attempts to solidify their political standing in 
the country and the world represent the second phase of the Junta as articulated by Acuña and 
Smulovitz, “to craft the future political order.”85 The year 1979, however, greatly debilitated the 
regime. First, the economy started to collapse with a large external debt, a falling investment 
rate, a recession, and rising inflation rates.86 Then, a visit by the Comisión Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos (CIDH)—Interamerican Commission on Human Rights—questioned the 
validity of the Junta in its revealing report. Videla attempted to use this visit to construct a 
narrative that the repression used by the Junta targeted the threats to the country; however, the 
report criticized the regime and articulated to the national and international communities some of 
the realities in the country at that time. “The report ended up legitimizing both internally and 
externally the claims of the human rights organizations,” adding to the momentum of many 
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human rights organizations in the country, namely the Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo—
Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo—and the Asamblea Permanente por los 
Derechos Humanos—Permanent Assembly for Human Rights.87 As the human rights 
organizations gained strength and power and the economy continued to deteriorate, the tensions 
within the armed forces rose. General Viola replaced General Videla in 1980 as an attempt to 
stabilize the regime; however, this endeavor failed, and a palace coup resulted in General Galtieri 
assuming power. The search for stability articulated the intra-military tensions and presented as a 
warning sign for impending struggles.  
 On April 2, 1982, the Military Junta waged a war against the United Kingdom to 
recuperate the Falkland Islands from British control. A long-standing controversy between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom revolve around the ownership of the islands, as the 
Argentines believe that they should control the land. The original intent of the Junta “was a 
symbolic demonstration” in an attempt to unify the country and regain their power around a 
state-wide belief of the Argentine right to the Falkland Islands; instead, Argentina suffered a 
tremendous loss within a 73-day period.88 However, the defeat on the Falkland Islands created an 
opportunity for the country to question the regime.89 The Falkland Islands War, therefore, “can 
be considered as the beginning of the end of the dictatorship” as “Falklands was the tragic 
extreme to which [the people] were dragged after long periods in which death had become 
almost a habit."90 This loss invigorated the people to question the regime and fight against it. 
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Further, the regime had lost so much of its power, it no longer had the ability to negotiate an 
exit—the political parties did not want to collaborate with a collapsing regime.91 After the 
tremendous loss in the Falkland Islands, the Junta found itself completely debilitated and 
recognized a need to protect itself as the end of their reign approached. 
 The Proceso began to enact decrees and laws with the aim of self-preservation in the 
uncertain future. The first act occurred on April 28, 1983 when the Junta published the 
Documento Final de la Junta Militar sobre la Guerra contra la Subversión y el Terrorismo 
(Documento Final)—Final Document of the Military Junta on the War against Subversion and 
Terrorism —and the Acta Institucional—Institutional Act. These documents defended the 
Junta’s actions as necessary to fight against the “rural guerilla” as well as stated that “many of 
the disappearances are a consequence of the way the terrorists operated.”92 The Final Document 
acted as a final opportunity for the Junta to advocate for the legitimacy of their government. The 
Institutional Act had a similar objective: “All operations against subversion and terrorism carried 
out by the security, police, and prison forces…were carried out in accordance with plans 
approved and supervised by the high-level organic officers of the Armed Forces and by the 
Board Military from the time of its constitution.”93 These documents emphasized the obligation 
of such actions as part of military service and, therefore, those individuals could not face 
punishment. These first actions of the Junta clarified its goal of redeeming itself, describing its 
actions as favorable and aligned with anti-communist motives, and avoiding future 
condemnations. 
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 A couple months after the Final Document and Institutional Act and before the October 
1983 elections, the Junta published Law N22.924 or the Ley de Pacificación Nacional—Law of 
National Pacification or Self-Amnesty Law—which “granted immunity to suspects of acts of 
state terrorism, as well as to all members of the Armed Forces, for crimes committed between 
May 25, 1973 and June 17, 1982.”94 This effort by the Junta presented a last attempt to assure a 
future without trials and judgements; however, the armed forces did not all agree that this 
constituted the next logical step. Some believed that they had not committed any acts requiring a 
pardon while others opposed a potential amnesty for the subversives.95 Therefore, the first article 
guarantees immunity for acts taken by the armed forces while the second and third exclude the 
members of “illicit terrorist or subversive associations.”96 These final three actions of the Junta 
demonstrate their desired legacy of a respected military regime protecting the country by any and 
all means necessary against communist subversives and, therefore, should not face punishment. 
 Without any other options, Argentina had its first democratic presidential elections after 
the Junta’s reign on October 30, 1983. Raúl Alfonsín, the Radical Party candidate won with 52% 
of the votes. Throughout his campaign, Alfonsín advocated for human rights issues and the need 
to try the perpetrators of the violations that had just occurred. He created and identified three 
categories of perpetrators: “those who planned the repression and gave the accompanying orders; 
those who acted beyond the scope of the orders, moved by cruelty, perversity, or greed; and 
those who strictly complied with the orders.”97 His outspoken belief in human rights and his 
willingness to take action helped secure his win. However, once in office, Alfonsín had to 
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balance the sanctioning of members of the armed forces who had committed the crimes and the 
incorporation of the military into the new government.98  
The newly democratic government believed in the importance of trials to “reestablish the 
credibility of the Argentine state and consolidate democratic institutions” as “some form of 
accountability was necessary, not only from a human rights standpoint, but also to affirm the 
core tenets of liberal democracy.”99 Alfonsín began an “unrestrained search for the whereabouts 
of those who disappeared,” which took the form of the creation of the Comisión Nacional sobre 
la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP)— National Commission on Disappeared Persons.100 
CONADEP investigated the whereabouts of the thousands of disappeared persons and published 
its report Nunca Más—Never Again—in 1984. The report detailed “the general process by which 
the military deprived civilians of their human rights: abduction, detention in clandestine centers, 
torture, and, in many cases, murder” and approximated 8,960 unaccounted for persons.101 This 
number has since been raised to 30,000. 
 Alfonsín also articulated three principles regarding punishment: “1) Both state and 
subversive terrorism should be punished. 2) There must be limits on those held responsible, for it 
would be impossible effectively to pursue all those who had committed crimes. 3) The trials 
should be limited to a finite period during which public enthusiasm for such a program remained 
high.”102 These principles largely influenced Alfonsín’s actions.  
In December 1983, Alfonsín published Decrees 157/83 and 158/83, called la teoría de los 
dos demonios—the theory of the two demons—which allowed for the prosecution of military 
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officials and guerilla members. By condemning both the military and the guerilla, he attempted 
to appease all sides, showing no favoritism or targeting. Decree 157 ordered the arrest and 
prosecution of seven guerillas including Mario Eduardo Firmenich, Fernando Vaca Marvaja, 
Roberto Cirilo Perdía, and Enrique Heraldo Gorriarán Merlo while Decree 158 called for the 
arrest of Lieutenant General Jorge. R. Videla, Brigadier General Orlando R. Agosti, Admiral 
Emilio A. Massera, Lieutenant General Roberto E. Viola, Brigadier General Omar D. R. 
Graffigna, Admiral Armando J. Lambruschini, Lieutenant General Leopoldo F. Galtieri, 
Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo and Admiral Jorge I. Anaya.103 He also sanctioned Law 
N23.040, which repealed the Self-Amnesty Law. Law N23.040 states annulment of law N22.924 
and emphasizes that the self-amnesty law has no legal effect for the prosecution of the emerging 
criminal, civil, administrative and military responsibilities of the facts which it seeks to cover.104 
These decrees and law supported his first goal of punishing both state and subversive terrorists.  
He also sanctioned Law N23.049 which granted modifications to the Military Justice 
Code. Alfonsín had worked to reform and reconstitute the courts and had planned to use military 
courts for high-ranking members of the armed forces and civil courts for those responsible for 
human rights violations; however, Law 23.049 changed this plan. On February 13, 1984, 
Congress passed the Reform of the Military Code which allowed military trials to appear before 
civil courts upon appeal as well as articulated the first concept of due obedience, referring to the 
three categories of perpetrators mentioned above.105 This law addressed his second goal of 
reasonable limits of prosecutions. 
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 While trials for the Junta occurred in the military courts in 1983, sufficient action did not 
result; therefore, on April 22, 1985, the trial of the Juntas began. On December 9, 1985, the 
civilian Court of Appeals found Emilio Massera, Jorge Videla, Roberto Viola, Armando 
Lambrushini and Orlando Agosti guilty. The members received varying sentences with Videla 
and Massera receiving life imprisonment and permanent disqualification from holding public 
office.106 These trials, however, had enormous social and political consequences. A series of 
military uprisings ensued, forcing Alfonsín to promulgate two more laws. On December 24, 
1986, Congress passed the Ley de Punto Final—Full Stop Law—which put a two-month limit 
for filing new claims on criminal activity as outline in Law 23.049.107 This attempted to appease 
the armed forces; however, the uprisings continued. A rebel group of military members, named 
the carapintadas—painted faces—began rioting in the crisis de Semana Santa—Easter 
Rebellion. On April 14, 1987, the carapintadas painted their faces as symbols of wartime, 
origination of the name, and protested until Alfonsín met with them on April 19, Easter Sunday. 
Alfonsín published the Acta de Compromiso Democrático—Act of Democratic Compromise—, 
which further outlined the importance of recognizing different levels of responsibility in the 
actions of the past.108 This created the path for the Ley de Obedencia Debida—Due Obedience 
Law—which passed Congress on June 8, 1987. The Due Obedience Law stated that individuals 
following the orders of their supervisors cannot receive punishments. These last two laws 
demonstrated the efforts of Alfonsín to prosecute the armed forces and integrate them into the 
new democracy. Weeks after passing the Due Obedience Law, the Supreme Court ruled the law 
constitutional, finding that the Court cannot review the law of a co-equal branch of government 
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“so long as the act was reasonable,” should not commandeer the legislature’s political role of 
deciding appropriate measures, and the legislature has the ability to decide not to penalize certain 
actions.109 However, the success of the Due Obedience Law reached its peak in the judicial 
system, as politically and socially it did not assist the Radical Party in the 1987 provincial and 
parliamentary elections. 
 In the time between the 1987 laws and the next presidential election in 1989, the 
carapintadas had begun to rebel again. On January 15, 1988, a military judge ordered the 
preventative imprisonment of Lieutenant Coronel Aldo Rico; however, he escaped and rebelled 
against the military chief of staff, General José Dante Caridi.110 At the end of that year, Coronel 
Mohammed Alí Seineldín led the carapintadas to Villa Martelli.111 While these rebellions ended 
promptly and with little bloodshed, the Alfonsín government faced another attack by a leftist 
group the Movimiento Todos por la Patria (MTP)—Movement of Everyone for the Country—on 
January 23, 1989. The MTP took control of a military garrison in La Tablada, Buenos Aires, 
which resulted in the death of 39 people, 28 of whom belonged to the group.112 This attack 
tarnished the reputation of the human rights trials and, as the economy continued to spiral 
downward, created an unfavorable environment for the Radical Party in the next election. 
 On May 14, 1989, Argentina held elections where the Peronist candidate Carlos Menem 
won. The carapintadas strongly supported Menem and believed he would grant control of the 
armed forces to them. On October 8, 1989, within months of assuming the title, he issued his 
first presidential pardon of 277 military personnel condemned for the Falkland Islands War, 
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human rights violations, and the military uprisings.113 This pardon did not include, however, the 
highest members of the Junta. Although the pardon appeared to favor the carapintadas, many of 
the leaders had lost their ranks and thus became disillusioned with Menem. The carapintadas 
had different ways of responding to their anger, which divided them into two groups, some 
aligning with Rico while others followed Seineldín. On December 3, 1990, the carapintadas 
pursued the most violent uprising—21 people dead, 50 injured, and more than 30 detained—that 
ultimately resulted in their defeat in the military arena.114 Weeks after the downfall of the 
carapintadas and following a decrease in public support for more human rights trials, Menem 
issued his second pardon this time for the former heads of the Junta including Massera, Videla, 
Viola, Lambrushini, Agosti, Camps, Richieri, and Firmenich.115 The pardon also acquitted those 
who had not yet been convicted of crimes and did not have any political necessity for such an 
action, while those freed did not face any moral condemnation.116 After the defeat of the 
carapintadas and Menem’s pardons, transitional justice policies in the country diminished, 
especially as Menem inundated the judiciary with friends and members of his political party.117 
 The first international findings surfaced in 1992 when the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) issued Report 28/92 stating that the Due Obedience and Full Stop 
Laws violated Articles 1, 8, and 25 of the American Convention, and Argentina should “clarify 
the facts and identify those responsible for the human rights violations committed under the 
military dictatorship;” however, Argentina did not comply with this finding or 
recommendations.118 A few years later, the first international complaint filed against the 
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Argentine Junta occurred on March 28, 1996 when Carlos Castresana named 38 Spanish victims 
in his case in front of Baltazar Garzón in Spain.119 This case immediately grew, amassing to 300 
cases in October and uniting a team of political parties, lawyers, and activists, until Garzón 
issued the first international detention order against Galtieri.120 Ultimately, Garzón consolidated 
the Argentine case with that of Chile shortly after Pinochet’s arrest in 1998. 
Moreover, in 1994, Argentina had a constitutional convention with the original goal to 
allow for presidential reelection; however, this allowed for a progressive delegation to promote 
Article 75, which grants international human rights treaties and documents—Universal and 
American Declarations on Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, and specific 
treaties relating to torture and genocide—constitutional rank.121 This effectively states that these 
treaties hold precedence over Argentine laws, even if the laws promulgated after the ratification 
of the treaties.122  
One year later, in 1995, Emilio Mignone and Carmen Lapacó, both parents of 
disappeared daughters, petitioned the Ministry of Defense for any information regarding the 
whereabouts of disappeared persons within Buenos Aires.123 The Federal Court of Appeals 
initially denied their request; however Mignone and Lapacó emphasized that the path to 
criminalization had closed but that did not impede their right to information and to the remains of 
their loved ones.124 The Buenos Aires Appeals Court agreed and ordered the Ministry to 
investigate; however, the Ministry did not adequately respond, resulting in Lapacó insisting on 
the involvement of other institutions.125 The Court of Appeals then reversed their decision, 
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causing Lapacó to appeal to the Supreme Court, where she ultimately lost. However, in October 
1998, Lapacó and nine human rights organizations brought the case to the IACHR.126 Before the 
Commission could issue a decision, the Argentine government settled with the Lapacó family in 
November 1999, committing to “accept and guarantee the right to truth,” pledging the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts to determine the truth regarding the disappeared persons, and promising 
to allocate a group of ad hoc prosecutors to assist in all such cases.127 During this time, truth 
trials emerged, with the first in La Plata in April 1998.128 
Simultaneously, Judge Marquevich, ordered the arrest of Videla in July 1998, on the 
crime of child kidnapping, concealment, forgery of birth certificates, and suppression of the civil 
status of a minor.129 Marquevich found the systematic baby-snatching plans as an effort to 
separate families and remove them from their homes; furthermore, he determined that baby-
snatching and denial of identity constituted continuous crimes until the children returned to their 
homes and their identities restored, meaning the amnesty laws did not apply.130 Another court 
case appeared in 2000 against two known torturers—Juan Antonio del Cerro and Julio Héctor 
Simón—and seven other officers for the illegal kidnapping of an eight-month-old girl, Claudia 
Victoria Poblete, and the disappearances of her parents.131 Judge Gabriel Cavallo issued arrest 
warrants for del Cerro and Simón on November 1, 2000, declaring it absurd to investigate what 
happened to the child and not to the parents.132 Cavallo found the amnesty laws invalid and 
inapplicable, declaring the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws null and void in March 2001.133 
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Two years later, after the election of Nestor Kirchner, Congress declared the amnesty laws 
unconstitutional and, in 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the 2001 decision, effectively 
terminating the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws.134 Further, the Supreme Court found the two 
pardons unconstitutional, which led to the re-arrest of many military officers. 
 
Chile 
 Salvador Allende won the presidency as a Socialist candidate in 1970, with a plurality of 
the vote. This presidency divided the country as the heavy anti-communist sentiment radiated 
from the Cold War apprehensions.  As the CIA, under the guidance of President Richard Nixon, 
interfered in the affairs of Chile in the hopes of removing Allende from power, tensions mounted 
among the public between Allende’s supporters and the opposition.  
Nearly three years into Allende’s presidency, the military executed a coup d’état that 
resulted in Allende’s death and the beginning of the military dictatorship. On that same day, 
September 11, 1973, the Junta dictated its first decree which granted complete executive power 
to General Augusto Pinochet and stated its mission to remove Marxism-Leninism from the 
country as well as declared a state of emergency, or “state of siege,” that granted power to the 
military courts and allowed for severe actions in order to combat the subversives.135 Genaro 
Arriagada emphasized the ability for the Junta to commandeer the country as “the society had 
become extremely polarized, and political and social hatred permeated the entire social 
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fabric.”136 Chilean society had such deep ruptures that many supported the dictatorship and 
believed it the solution to the problems the country faced.137 
Around 3,000 people died, more than 100,000 individuals fled to exile, and countless 
more filled up the prisons and concentration camps as political prisoners within the first days 
following the coup.138 The once-democratic nation disintegrated into a dictatorship as “the 
government dissolved the legislature, trade unions, and political parties[;] burned the voter rolls 
and intervened in the universities, appointing active duty military officers as university 
presidents[;] shut down the newspapers…and established censorship of the press and of 
books…[and] enforced a curfew for more than a decade.”139 The month following the coup 
represents some of the darkest moments during the dictatorship as the Caravana de la Muerte—
Caravan of Death—loomed over the country. The personal delegate to Pinochet, General Sergio 
Arellano Stark led a mission that left at least 75 individuals dead around the country within the 
first 40 days.140 Stark would fly the Puma helicopter and present himself to the commanding 
officer, demanding full control over the base. While Stark enjoyed gala lunches and meetings, 
his men would secretly remove prisoners—either awaiting military court or recently sentenced 
for minor infractions—from jail cells and execute them, some in the desert whose bodies have 
yet to appear.141 Further, Pinochet created the DINA by Decree 521, which implemented an 
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organization solely beholden to him used to monitor “enemies of the state” and who often 
spearheaded disappearances.142  
 The news of the grave human rights violations occurring in the country reached 
international levels, as the United Nations decided to send a team of observers to the country in 
July 1975. Pinochet originally supported this visit; however, the day before their arrival, 
Pinochet reneged on his decision to allow them into the country.143 This dramatically damaged 
international relations, specifically with the United States, as countries began to recognize the 
use of institutionalized torture and crimes against humanity in the country, delegitimizing 
Pinochet’s government.144 Relations with the United States worsened when the DINA 
assassinated Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in September 1976 in Washington D.C.145  
After such damaging events to Pinochet’s legitimacy, in January 1978, the country held a 
plebiscite that stated, “In the face of international aggression unleashed against the government 
of our country, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile, and I reaffirm 
the legitimate right of the Republic to conduct the process of institutionalization in a manner 
befitting its sovereignty,” which unsurprisingly, Pinochet won with 80% of the vote.146 The 
environment of this plebiscite did not allow for a fair voting system, as many people lived in fear 
of the powers of the regime. Shortly thereafter, Pinochet administered Decree 2,191—the 
amnesty law. Decree 2,191 grants amnesty “to all persons who committed criminal acts either as 
perpetrators, accomplices, or accessories during the period when the state of siege was in force 
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between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978,” this includes those not prosecuted or 
convicted (Article 1) and those who have been (Article 2).147 
 Under a false guise of success after the 1978 plebiscite and the amnesty as well as a 
booming economy led by the Chicago Boys, Pinochet proposed a new Constitution on 
September 11, 1980—exactly seven years after the coup. The proposed Constitution, which 
passed with 68% of the vote, maintained Pinochet as president and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army for the following eight years as well as the opportunity for appointment as a senator for 
life after the end of his last term.148 The 1980 Constitution required a plebiscite in 1988 to 
determine the future of the country. While the Constitution passed, the opposition to Pinochet, 
namely the Christian Democrats and the Communist and Socialist Parties, united to denounce the 
Constitution as illegitimate.149 On August 15, 1983, the unlikely allies formed the Alianza 
Democrática (Democratic Alliance)—a pact among political parties—and the Asamblea de la 
Civilidad (Civic Assembly)—a social agreement for civil society groups and organizations.150 
The beginning of the unification caused trouble as each side had different approaches, 
highlighted in the protests of 1982.151  
After the passage of the Constitution, the Latin American debt crisis hit Chile as 
unemployment rose and GDP fell, requiring a transition away from the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal 
economy.152 Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the newly appointed Minister of the Interior, implemented the 
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“politics of liberalization” which allowed important political leaders in exile to return, relaxed 
press censorship, and attempted to engage with the opposition.153 With the support of 
Archbishop Santiago Juan Francisco Fresno, a dialogue emerged between Jarpa, important civil 
society members, and leaders of the Democratic Alliance. This created a foothold for the 
opposition of the Pinochet regime, which some contend effectively “initiated the process of 
transition toward democracy.”154  
As the opposition began to create a strong alliance together, a “catastrophic equilibrium” 
emerged with the Democratic Alliance on one side and Pinochet on the other: Pinochet 
maintained his power, however, did not have the ability to destroy the opposition while the 
opposition controlled the civil society but lacked the capacity to change government.155 Aylwin 
contends that the mobilization of the civil society greatly affected widespread support of 
Pinochet and the military regime.156 However, an assassination attempt by the Frente Patriótico 
Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR)—an armed sector of the Communist Party—on Pinochet in 1986 
increased repression again and decreased social mobilization.157 After the attack, the opposition 
reunited abiding by a nonviolent approach. With the 1988 plebiscite widely anticipated, the 
opposition decided to contest Pinochet. While the opposition would have preferred an open 
election, the Democratic Alliance worked within the confines of the 1980 Constitution and, 
instead, promoted the “no” vote, which would require elections as opposed to a “yes” which 
would prolong the dictatorship another eight years. President Patricio Aylwin emphasized “the 
one important decision was to attempt to defeat the military using its own rules of the game…We 
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finally defeated Pinochet within his own institutional framework, without altering too much or 
compromising what we could call peaceful coexistence among Chileans.”158 President Ricardo 
Lagos underscores this sentiment: “Aylwin said that we had to accept Pinochet’s constitution in 
order to change it later…Pinochet’s constitution was a fact that exists, that is enforced; so if this 
is the de facto situation, then we can attempt to change that constitution without thereby 
according it legitimacy.”159 As the only remaining country under military rule in the Southern 
Cone, the plebiscite garnered international attention, with the U.S.-based National Democratic 
Institute monitoring the voting process.160 On October 5, 1988, the NO campaign won with 56% 
of the vote and allowed for an open election in the following year. 
 
Figure 3: YES and NO Campaigns: symbol and slogan (Kurdyuk) 
 Despite the NO campaign winning the plebiscite, the country remained deeply divided. 
Pinochet maintained national support, as he received 44% of the vote, and the respect of the 
military. The concessions of the 1980 Constitution guaranteed Pinochet certain powers even after 
his removal from office, specifically remaining Commander-in-Chief of the Army for eight 
years—longer than the term of the first democratically elected president—and a position as 
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senator for life after those years. Further, Pinochet appointed 14 of 17 Supreme Court justices to 
more deeply entrench the amnesty as well as eight senators for life.161 
 On December 14, 1989, Chile held its first democratic elections. The Concertación de 
Partidos por la Democracia (Concertación)—Coalition of Parties for Democracy—founded in 
1988 from the NO campaign coalition proposed its first presidential candidate: Patricio Aylwin. 
Aylwin, a Christian Democrat, received 55% of the vote, and became the first democratically 
elected president after the dictatorship on March 11, 1990. 
Aylwin entered power in a unique situation, one he understood as a complex balancing 
act. In order to please all sides, Aylwin used the phrase, “justice to the extent possible.” Aylwin 
defends such a decree: 
the phrase…reflected a degree of prudence, because if justice was going to be total, if it 
meant trying Pinochet and all his people, there was going to be a civil war. “To the extent 
possible” was a viable course because there were trials, but not a beheading, not 
aggressive actions against those who continued to have the power of arms.162  
This mindset demonstrates the balancing act between finding justice for the victims of the 
dictatorship as well as maintaining a path to democracy. This frame largely influenced the 
actions taken by the government. The first phase of Aylwin’s presidency reflected one of 
investigation into the human rights abuses. 
One month after Aylwin assumed the presidency, on April 25, 1990, he issued Supreme 
Decree No. 355 which created the Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación—National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation—or the Rettig Commission to document human rights 
abuses resulting in death or disappearances during the military dictatorship from September 11, 
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1973 to March 11, 1990. The Decree names the eight members of the Commission, with former 
Senator Raúl Rettig Guissen as the President, as well as their task and mandate. After nine 
months of investigation, the Rettig Report, published February 8, 1991, documented 2,279 cases 
of disappearance, killing, torture and kidnapping (641 others where the Commission lacked 
consensus and 508 more outside of the mandate) largely occurring during the first three years of 
the regime and spearheaded by the DINA.163 The Rettig Commission detailed the repressive 
apparatus of the regime, highlighted the widespread abuses, evaluated the judiciary, and issued 
recommendations such as reparations; however, the mandate did not result in judicial 
consequences, include crimes such as torture or exile, nor name the perpetrators.164 The report 
enraged the military, inciting a response in which the army fervently denied such actions and 
contended an “unforgivable ignorance” on part of the Commission.165 Pinochet, acting as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army did not approve of the Rettig Report; however, Aylwin 
subdued Pinochet and the army by emphasizing the chain of command articulated in the 1980 
Constitution. This emphasized Aylwin’s power and restrained the military.166 Human rights 
activists around the world also felt discouraged by the report, as they felt the Commission could 
have done more.167  
 In the following years, Aylwin issued pardons to those still incarcerated by the Military 
Courts. By January 1994 the administration had issued 135 pardons, with five more pending, and 
only 12 people remaining imprisoned from the military regime.168 However, the administration 
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faced difficulties continuing with its human rights agenda as the judicial and legislative systems 
maintained allegiance with Pinochet. Aylwin relied on the other two branches of government to 
investigate, reopen, or initiate cases as well as establish responsibility for the crimes.169 The 
military remained strong after the transition to Aylwin and Pinochet’s legacy remained clear 
throughout government. Aylwin attempted to reform the judicial system and the judicial branch 
began to rule on such issues; however, during his time as president, the judiciary remained 
infiltrated by Pinochet’s legacy. For example, in 1993, the Supreme Court issued a historic ruling 
in which they found the DINA responsible for the disappearance of a Chilean citizen; however, 
they also found that the amnesty applied.170 
 The second presidential elections occurred in 1993, with Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the 
representative for the Concertación, assuming office in March of the following year.171 Frei 
continued on Aylwin’s path of replacing Pinochet-era judges on the Supreme Court, appointing 
seven of seventeen judges who brought new approaches, which resulted in the 1995 sentencing 
of General Manuel Contreras, the former head of the DINA, and seven other members charged 
as the architects of Orlando Letelier’s death.172 This seemingly progressive movement of the 
courts halted in 1996 as a summary of cases details, “‘Although last year we reported that the 
courts were divided over how and whether to apply the amnesty law, we now have to conclude 
that the backsliding over the last year points to the consolidation of a sinister jurisprudence for 
the goals of truth and justice.’”173 Further efforts by Frei attempted to reverse this. The 
government issued a 1998 reform that expanded the number of seats from 17 to 21 and required 
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that five ministers must have a legal degree and have practiced for at least 15 years outside of the 
established judiciary.174 Further, Frei created the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, a 
five-person taskforce in charge of hearing appeals against case closure that eventually turned into 
an investigatory chamber, and altered the relationship between the criminal and military courts, 
which turned over some cases to the civilian courts.175 This allowed for the important reopening 
of the Poblete Córdova case on September 8, 1998 where the Supreme Court decided that the 
international treaties (namely the Geneva Conventions) signed by Chile have supremacy in 
Chilean law over the amnesty, for “if the regime considered itself in a state of war, argued the 
proponents of this theory, they were obliged to act accordingly and respect the laws of war, and 
were estopped from now arguing those rules did not apply.”176 Another important ruling, the 
Parral case, in January 1999, found that cases of illegal detention or kidnapping constituted 
continuous crimes and, therefore, extend past the dates of the amnesty law.177 
 In the international sphere, in June 1996, Joan Garcés and Manuel Murillo issued a 
criminal complaint against General Pinochet and members of his command with charges of 
genocide, terrorism, and torture.178 With the Argentine complaint filed months earlier, the 
Chilean case differed in three ways: 1) this case had fewer suspects as a result of the centralized 
repression, which allowed for a narrower agenda, 2) less public documents and a lower profile 
judge in García Castellón, and 3) a single, unified legal team.179 The global community began to 
actively support the Spanish case while the Chilean government did not acknowledge it until the 
case progressed. The United States actively participated in the investigation after Judge García 
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Castellón asked for information regarding the murder of Letelier, which led to new information 
such as the severity of Operation Condor and the possibility for terrorist attacks by the DINA on 
foreign soil, including acts in Spain.180 Weeks before Spain issued an international arrest warrant 
for Pinochet, General Juan Fernando Torres Silva, one of his most trusted advisors, volunteered 
to testify in front of Judge Castellón on October 3, 1998. Torres Silva claimed his intent as one to 
underscore the necessity and legality of the actions of Pinochet’s regime; however, it validated 
and legitimized the investigation.181 
 Pinochet flew to London on September 23, 1998 to receive treatment for a herniated disk; 
however, this trip resulted in the culmination of international communication and partnership to 
prosecute the dictator. With the international human rights community aware of Pinochet’s 
upcoming trip; they collaborated to arrest him in London. On October 13, 1998, Garcés and 
Enrique Santiago, a lawyer in the Argentine case, submitted briefs to Judges Castellón and 
Garzón, outlining and describing the link of Operation Condor.182 In the following days, the 
Judges requested, via Interpol, that the British authorities allow for the questioning of Pinochet 
after his recovery from surgery.183 Due to a high level of uncertainty regarding diplomatic 
immunity, the British police could not guarantee Pinochet’s presence without an arrest warrant; 
therefore, on October 16, Judge Garzón—not the specific judge of the Chilean case—rapidly 
issued the arrest warrant for crimes of genocide and terrorism, based on cases from Operation 
Condor.184 The warrant immediately went to the office of Magistrate Nicholas Evans who swore 
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out the warrant and, at 11 p.m., Scotland Yard arrested Pinochet at the London Clinic.185 The two 
cases—Argentina and Chile—merged together under Judge Garzón in the following days.186 
 The arrest of Pinochet in London sparked controversy around the world, as some 
approved and others condemned this measure. The European Parliament, the United Nations 
Committee on Torture, and other states approved of such actions and urged extradition or 
prosecution while others viewed this action as disregarding sovereignty.187 The Piquete de 
Londres, the London protests, erupted after Pinochet’s arrest with Chileans and other Latin 
Americans in exile communicating to discover where Pinochet remained and then holding vigils 
outside the clinic with Chilean flags, candles, and posters of the disappeared.188 The exiles 
greatly helped the efforts by bringing attention to the issue, raising global support, and assisting 
the legal efforts through transcribing and translating the court hearings for journalists around the 
world.189  
However, issues arose as to the arrest warrant’s legitimacy as the Spanish warrant 
charged Pinochet with crimes not available for extradition under British law. Garzón had to issue 
a second warrant in line with British law that charged Pinochet with “torture and conspiracy to 
torture from 1988 to 1992, with hostage-taking and conspiracy to take hostages from 1982 to 
1992, and with conspiracy to murder from January 1976 to 1992.”190 Magistrate Ronald Bartle 
approved the provisional warrant on October 23, and five days later three judges approved the 
second warrant almost in its entirety, except for the count of conspiracy to murder.191 In Madrid, 
the Court had to accept jurisdiction, which it did on October 30 after only one day of testimony. 
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With Pinochet in London, the House of Lords had to rule on his extradition, which 
Garzón asked for on November 4. After hearing oral arguments, mostly focused on the question 
of immunity, the judges announced on November 25, Pinochet’s 83rd birthday, a three to two 
decision to approve extradition.192 However, the judge who cast the deciding vote, Lord 
Hoffman, had ties to Amnesty International, and although everyone concluded this had no 
bearing on his decision, the House of Lords revoked the earlier decision and approved a new 
trial.193 On March 25, 1999, after the second trial, the Lords announced a six to one decision that 
stated Pinochet’s crimes as extraditable and his immunity did not extend to such crimes; 
however, this slate of charges drastically reduced in size from the first.194 Home Secretary Jack 
Straw reissued the authority to proceed with the extradition on April 5, setting in motion the 
extradition hearings which allowed for cases prior to December 8, 1988 as “‘conspiracy is a 
continuing offence” and determined that disappearances resulted in “‘mental torture’” for the 
families.195 This hearing got the Chilean government more involved with the case, arguing for 
respect for their sovereignty. Months after the hearing, the Chilean government called for 
medical testing for Pinochet, asking for doctors to verify his mental deterioration and grant his 
release.196 After the group of doctors evaluated Pinochet, they found him unfit for trial, which 
resulted in the January 11, 2000 declaration by Straw to close the proceedings and Pinochet’s 
return to Chile on March 3 with no extradition.197 
  Meanwhile, Chile had its third presidential elections on December 12, 1999, which 
resulted in a close race between the Concertación candidate, Ricardo Lagos, and Joaquín Lavín, 
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with the conservative Unión Demócrata Independiente—Independent Democratic Union. A run-
off election occurred on January 16, 2000, where Ricardo Lagos won.198 This election divided 
the right-wing parties and Pinochet, as Lavín pledged to distance himself from Pinochet 
throughout his campaign.199 This weakened Pinochet’s standing in the country and undermined 
his political relationships. 
Before the end of Frei’s administration, he implemented the Mesa de Diálogo—Table for 
Dialogue—that had “the generals, represented by the highest-level authority of the Army; across 
from them the human rights layers; then the Church and other moral institutions of the country; 
and finally a group of people who represented the political spectrum in Chile.”200 Each side of 
the table had its own goals: the military believed the roundtable “offered a chance to end the 
transition…[as] it would stop the parade of military officers before the courts and perhaps even 
do away with the theory of kidnapping as a continuing crime,” the human rights lawyers and 
their supporters wanted “new information on the location of the remaining detained/disappeared” 
as well as “institutional recognition of the responsibility of the armed forces for the human rights 
violations and a public commitment of the military to never engage in such acts again,” and the 
religious leaders hoped for “national reconciliation.”201  
The discussions had appeared to reach a culmination until Pinochet arrived back in Chile 
and the army gave him a “hero’s welcome,” which angered the human rights activists.202 
However, Lagos reunited the group and presented their agreement in a speech on June 13, 2000. 
The declaration included a six-month period of investigation whereby the armed forces and 
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police agreed to research and uncover information regarding the whereabout of the detained-
disappeared and give it to churches under an oath of secrecy who would then pass the 
information to President Lagos.203 On January 7, 2001, President Lagos announced the findings 
of the investigations: 200 cases of disappearances, 130 disposed in oceans, lakes, and rivers and 
20 others in mass graves.204  
After Pinochet’s arrival back to Chile, domestic cases against him accumulated. Within a 
day of his departure from London, Gladys Marín filed the first complaint against Pinochet and by 
the time he landed in Santiago, individuals had filed over 60 complaints—this number would 
only rise.205 These cases included those from family members of victims of the Caravan of Death 
charging murder, illegal burial, violations of the Geneva Conventions, and later kidnapping and 
illegal association.206 All cases naming Pinochet as a defendant consolidated under Judge Juan 
Guzmán Tapia of the Santiago Appeals Court.207 Guzmán tirelessly investigated the cases, 
finding many cases of kidnapping—continuing crimes that sidestepped the amnesty law—and 
ultimately issuing arrest warrants for members of the Caravan of Death: ex-General Arellano 
Stark, ex-Colonel Sergio Arredondo, ex-Brigadier Pedro Espinoza, ex-Colonel Patrizio Díaz 
Araneda and ex-Major Marcelo Manuel Moren Brito.208 On March 7, 2000, Guzmán petitioned 
to revoke Pinochet’s immunity to investigate his involvement with the Caravan of Death and 
charged him with kidnapping; on June 5, the Santiago Appeals Court stripped his parliamentary 
immunity by a vote of 13 to 9 which the Supreme Court ratified by 14 to 6.209 At the end of the 
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year, Guzmán indicted Pinochet with 18 counts of kidnapping and aggravated homicide in the 
Caravan of Death cases and ordered him to house arrest.210 The country remained divided as 
relatives of victims celebrated and his allies complained. Questions arose as to Pinochet’s 
medical stability, so Guzmán went to Pinochet’s residence on January 22, 2001 to take his 
statement and found him lucid, reissuing his indictment on January 29.211 Over a year after 
Guzmán reissued his indictment, a panel of the Court of Appeals found Pinochet unfit to stand 
trial due to subcortical dementia, resulting in the Supreme Court closing his case on July 1, 
2002.212 
After the ending of Pinochet’s trial, many people believed they had yet to voice their 
experiences, so President Lagos created the Valech Commission, or the Comisión Nacional 
Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture) 
on September 26, 2003.213 President Lagos said of his decision to create the Valech Commission, 
“those who had been in prison continued to argue that no one acknowledged what they had gone 
through, and that when they asked for their record and it appeared that they had been prisoners, 
they had to explain that they were prisoners because of their political ideas.”214 
As opposed to the narrow scope of the Rettig Report, the Valech Commission 
documented abuses of civil rights or politically motivated torture, identified victims, and 
proposed recommendations. The Commission issued two reports (November 2004 and June 
2005) as cases remained after the deadline for the first report. As a result of the first edition of 
the report, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, officially took 
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responsibility for the actions of the Army in November 2004: “The Army has taken the hard but 
irreversible decision to assume responsibility as an institution in all punishable and morally 
unacceptable acts of the past.”215 This demonstrated the wide-sweeping change happening in 
Chile regarding the acceptance of the past and the human rights violations that occurred 
throughout the dictatorship. 
As a free man, Pinochet appeared on a Miami TV station, declaring he had done nothing 
wrong.216 This interview incentivized Guzmán to indict Pinochet on 20 charges of 
disappearances in conjunction with Operation Condor, as he clearly demonstrated he could stand 
trial.217 On August 26, 2004, the Supreme Court again stripped Pinochet of his immunity by a 
close nine to eight vote.218 Around the same time, the United States found that Pinochet had “125 
illicit bank accounts with over US$20 million.”219 By the time of his death on December 10, 
2006, Pinochet had around 300 criminal charges still pending against him.220  
Chile has continued its efforts for justice, which includes the continual search for those 
disappeared and trials for perpetrators that worked within the Pinochet regime. As of June 2019, 
the country found and identified 307 detained-disappeared individuals.221  
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
“There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time 
when we fail to protest.” 
Elie Wiesel (Holocaust survivor and activist) 
 This section will present and analyze the data to evaluate the hypotheses posed that 
attempt to answer the question: Why do civilian governments of newly democratic countries 
respond differently to the human rights violations that occurred during their dictatorships?  
Before analyzing the hypotheses, this paper will discuss the classifications as democracy 
or dictatorship of the countries over time. Argentina’s dictatorial period from 1976 to 1983 
presents as Not Free during the middle years (1977 to 1982) and Partly Free during the first and 
last year (1976 and 1983) according to Freedom House.222 From 1984 to 2020, Freedom House 
has classified Argentina as Free, except for 2001 to 2003 at which time a crisis occurred in the 
country.223 Between 1976 and 1982, Argentina received a 0 for democracy, a 9 for autocracy (8 
in 1982), and a Polity2 score of -9 (-8 for 1982) according to the Polity IV dataset.224 Since 1983, 
Argentina has received 7, 8, or 9 for democracy and Polity2 and 0 for autocracy, signifying a 
permanence of democracy in the country after the dictatorship.225 The Democracy and 
Dictatorship data set scored Argentina as a democracy from 1983 to 2007 (end of the dataset), 
scoring it as a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1982.226 TJRC has similar scoring to the 
Democracy and Dictatorship data set, finding Argentina Autocratic from 1976 to 1982.227 Table 
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3 shows the data from the four sources for Argentina: Freedom House, Polity IV, Democracy 
and Dictatorship, and the TJRC.  
Similarly, Chile received the classification of Not Free from 1974 to 1979, Partly Free 
from 1980 to 1989, and Free in 1973 and between 1990 and 2020.228 Interestingly, a period of 
dictatorship (1980-1989) scores as Partly Free for Freedom House. As for Chile, the scores 
varied from 1973 to 1990: between 1973 and 1982, the country received a 0 for democracy, 7 for 
autocracy and a Polity2 score of -7; between 1983 and 1987, Polity IV gave Chile a 0 for 
democracy, 6 for autocracy and -6 for Polity2; in 1988, Chile received a 2 for democracy, 3 for 
autocracy and -1 for Polity2; and in 1989 and 1990, an 8 for democracy, 0 for autocracy and 8 
for Polity2.229 After the dictatorship, Chile received Polity2 scores of 8, 9, and 10, with its first 
10 in 2005.230 The range in scores mirrors the disparity in Freedom House. As for Chile, the 
Democracy and Dictatorship data finds a military dictatorship from 1973 to 1989 and democracy 
from 1990 to the end of the data in 2007.231 The change in scores for Chile such as from Not 
Free to Partly Free for Freedom House in 1980 likely corresponds with the 1980 Constitution 
that implemented plebiscites as well as the decline in human rights violations that occurred 
earlier in the dictatorship while the change in a Polity2 score of -1 in 1988 aligns with the victory 
of the No campaign. Table 4 mirrors that of Table 3 but for Chile. 
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Table 3: Democracy Data for Argentina 
Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
1976 Partly Free -9 0 Autocratic 1989 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1977 Not Free -9 0 Autocratic 1990 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1978 Not Free -9 0 Autocratic 1991 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1979 Not Free -9 0 Autocratic 1992 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1980 Not Free -9 0 Autocratic 1993 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1981 Not Free -8 0 Autocratic 1994 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1982 Not Free -8 0 Autocratic 1995 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1983 Partly Free 8 1 Democratic 1996 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1984 Free 8 1 Democratic 1997 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1985 Free 8 1 Democratic 1998 Free 7 1 Democratic 
1986 Free 8 1 Democratic 1999 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1987 Free 8 1 Democratic 2000 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1988 Free 8 1 Democratic 2001 Partly 
Free 
8 1 Democratic 
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Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
2002 Partly Free 8 1 Democratic 2012 Free 8 1 —————— 
2003 Partly Free 8 1 Democratic 2013 Free 8 1 —————— 
2004 Free 8 1 Democratic 2014 Free 8 1 —————— 
2005 Free 8 1 Democratic 2015 Free 9 1 —————— 
2006 Free 8 1 Democratic 2016 Free 9 1 —————— 
2007 Free 8 1 Democratic 2017 Free 9 1 —————— 
2008 Free 8 1 Democratic 2018 Free 9 1 —————— 
2009 Free 8 1 Democratic 2019 Free ——— 1 —————— 
2010 Free 8 1 Democratic 2020 Free ———  —————— 
2011 Free 8 1 ——————       
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Table 4: Democracy Data for Chile 
Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
1973 Free -7 0 ————— 1986 Partly Free -6 0 ————— 
1974 Not Free -7 0 ————— 1987 Partly Free -6 0 ————— 
1975 Not Free -7 0 ————— 1988 Partly Free -1 0 ————— 
1976 Not Free -7 0 ————— 1989 Partly Free 8 0 Democratic 
1977 Not Free -7 0 ————— 1990 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1978 Not Free -7 0 ————— 1991 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1979 Not Free -7 0 ————— 1992 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1980 Partly Free -7 0 ————— 1993 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1981 Partly Free -7 0 ————— 1994 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1982 Partly Free -7 0 ————— 1995 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1983 Partly Free -6 0 ————— 1996 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1984 Partly Free -6 0 ————— 1997 Free 8 1 Democratic 
1985 Partly Free -6 0 ————— 1998 Free 8 1 Democratic 
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Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
Year Freedom 
House 
Polity IV 
(Polity2) 
Democracy 
and 
Dictatorship 
Transitional 
Justice 
Research 
Collaborative 
1999 Free 8 1 Democratic 2010 Free 10 ————— 
 
Democratic 
2000 Free 9 1 Democratic 2011 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2001 Free 9 1 Democratic 2012 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2002 Free 9 1 Democratic 2013 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2003 Free 9 1 Democratic 2014 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2004 Free 9 1 Democratic 2015 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2005 Free 9 1 Democratic 2016 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2006 Free 10 1 Democratic 2017 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2007 Free 10 1 Democratic 2018 Free 10 ————— ————— 
2008 Free 10 1 Democratic 2019 Free ——— ————— ————— 
2009 Free 10 ————— Democratic 2020 Free ——— ————— ————— 
 
Overall, the data aligns with the social discourse and history defining the periods of 
dictatorship and democracy of the countries as 1976 to the beginning of 1983 for Argentina and 
1973 to 1990 for Chile. The data also shows that Chile has had a more stable democracy than 
Argentina, constantly receiving Free from Freedom House and higher Polity2 scores from Polity 
IV after the end of the dictatorships—Argentina has not received a 10 Polity2 score. Figure 4 
shows the comparison of the two countries’ Polity2 scores. 
  
Figure 4: Polity2 Scores from 1972 to 2018 (Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers) 
 
Before analyzing the hypotheses, the paper will quantify justice using in-state reports and 
TJRC data. As of 2018, 3,081 people have been under the judicial process in Argentina (Figure 
5): 1,024 people have been sentenced—891 of whom have been convicted and 133 acquitted—
while 537 have died during the process.232 In Chile, between 1995 and June 30, 2019, 426 human 
rights lawsuits for 747 detained-disappeared and executed individuals and 221 survivors reached 
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a final sentence, 61 for civil compensation and 365 criminal cases.233 Over the past ten years, the 
Supreme Court witnessed more than half (295) of these cases. These sentences correspond to 
around 23.2% of the recognized disappeared and executed individuals while only responding to 
1.1% of torture victims.234 Figure 6 demonstrates the types of cases and sentences involved; 
Figure 7 outlines the results of the cases from July 2010 to June 2019 regarding the human rights 
cases spanning the period of 1973 to 1990.  
 
Figure 5: Persons investigated for crimes against humanity, according to the highest procedural situation achieved (Informe 
Estadístico Sobre el Estado de Las Causas Por Delitos de Lesa Humanidad En Argentina Diagnóstico 2018) 
 
 
233 “Informe Anual Sobre Derechos Humanos en Chile 2019,” 71-72. 
234 “Informe Anual Sobre Derechos Humanos en Chile 2019,” 73. 
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Figure 6: Victimization classes addressed by human rights criminal cases completed between 1995 and June 30, 2019 (“Informe 
Anual Sobre Derechos Humanos en Chile 2019”) 
 
Figure 7: Convictions in final rulings by the Supreme Court from July 2010 to June 2019 in cases of human rights violations 
committed between 1973 and 1990 (“Informe Anual Sobre Derechos Humanos en Chile 2019”) 
The Transitional Justice Research Collaborative analyzes the total number of 
prosecutions and guilty verdicts per country. Figure 8 demonstrates the total number of 
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prosecutions held in each country per year while Figure 9 sums these total numbers to arrive at 
the total number of prosecutions held in each country from all prior years. Figure 8 interestingly 
shows that when international pressure against Pinochet began in 1999, the trials surged in Chile. 
It also demonstrates that the largest surge in Argentina occurred between 2007 and 2009. The 
upward sloping curves in Figure 9 highlight that the total prosecutions continued to grow over 
time. During the analyzed time periods Argentina had 54 total trials and Chile had 33; this 
demonstrates the advantage Argentina had in transitioning before Chile.235 Creating an average 
number of prosecutions per year removes this time advantage, still revealing Argentina (1.92) 
had more prosecutions per year than Chile (1.5). Figure 10 shows that Argentine courts reached 
24 guilty verdicts and Chilean courts 14 during the studied time periods, meaning 44% of 
Argentine and 42% of Chilean prosecutions resulted in a guilty verdict.236 
 
Figure 8: Number of Prosecutions (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative) 
 
235 Leigh A. Payne et al. 
236 Leigh A. Payne et al. 
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Figure 9: Lagged Prosecutions Sum (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative) 
 
 
Figure 10: Lagged Guilty Verdicts Sum (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative) 
The combined data from the country reports and TJRC shows that Argentina started its 
justice process immediately after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1983 and continued to have 
more prosecutions and convictions than Chile. However, this does not diminish the existence of 
justice in Chile. 
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TESTING HYPOTHESES 
After confirming through data the periods of democracy and dictatorship and the levels of 
justice in each country, the paper will test and analyze the six hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Severity of Violence  
 As postulated earlier, the degree of human rights abuses during the dictatorship matter to 
the transitional justice policies implemented by a democratic government. The CIRI Data Project 
begins its analysis in 1981, meaning this set does not account for the beginning of each 
dictatorship. Argentina quickly jumped from a physical integrity rights index of 1 in 1981 to a 5 
in 1982 and 6 in 1983 while Chile had scores of 3 and below for 1981 to 1990, except for a 4 in 
1988.237 Figure 11 shows the fluctuation of respect for physical integrity rights in the countries 
after the dictatorships ended in 1983 and 1990 respectively, noting a steadier incline for Chile 
than Argentina. 
 
Figure 11: Physical Integrity Rights Index 1981-2011 (David Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay) 
 
237 David Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay. 
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The Latent Human Rights Protection scores demonstrate that Argentina experienced 
worse human rights violations during its dictatorship than Chile: Figure 12. Argentina’s worst 
year, 1977, received a lower score (-3.065) than Chile’s worst year of 1974 (-3.032).238 Figure 12 
also shows Chile’s faster progression towards respecting human rights violations than 
Argentina’s. However, the paper emphasizes the highest scoring of 5.4, meaning both countries 
with scores around 1 in the more recent years do not have the highest respect for human rights in 
the world setting. 
 
Figure 12: Latent Human Rights Protection Scores 1972-2017 (Schnakenberg and Fariss) 
 The last data source measuring physical integrity rights, PTS, takes information from 
three sources; however, only Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department issued reports 
on torture from 1976 to 2018 as Human Rights Watch began in 2013. Figure 13A plots the data 
received from Amnesty International reports. It shows that in the beginning years of the 
Argentine dictatorship, “terror expanded to the whole population” with widespread torture and 
 
238 Keith E Schnakenberg and Christopher J. Fariss, “Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 3,” Latent 
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other human rights violations.239 This remained the case for a majority of the dictatorship until 
the final years when the country reached a score of 3 in the final two years. The PTS does not 
have data for the beginning years of the Chilean dictatorship (1973-1975) when widespread 
violations occurred; however, Figure 13A shows that the country fluctuated between a 4 and 5 
until 1988 when it scored a 3. U.S. State Reports (Figure 13B) resulted in slightly different data 
on the PTS scoring system, rating Argentina as a 4—"Civil and political rights violations have 
expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a com-
mon part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest them-
selves in politics or ideas.”—for the majority of the dictatorship until the last two years when the 
country received a 3. Interestingly, the U.S. State Reports score Chile 3 or 4 for the duration of 
the dictatorship except for in 1986 when the country received a 5. Both organizations 
demonstrated that the countries fluctuated from 1 to 3 in the years after their dictatorship, with 
higher scores coming from Argentina—seen in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13: Political Terror Scale from Amnesty International (A) and U.S. State Reports (B) (Mark Gibney et al.) 
 The last sources of data regarding the heinousness of the human rights violations comes 
from reports executed within the countries as a result of presidential orders including Nunca Más 
(Argentina), the Rettig Report (Chile), and the Valech Report (Chile). Nunca Más provides 
narratives as well as data regarding the actions of the Argentine Junta, stating that the list “is a 
partial one” as many of the records disappeared with the individuals.240 The report finds 8,960 
people disappeared—but estimates now believe 30,000 disappeared—in 340 secret detention 
centers.241 The Rettig Report from Chile issued similar stories from those in Nunca Más, finding 
3,428 cases of disappearances, killing, torture, and kidnapping.242 The second truth finding report 
in Chile, the Valech Commission, found a total of 28,461 victims amounting to 34,690 
detentions, as some had suffered multiple detentions.243 Additionally, 68.57% of detentions 
occurred in the year 1973 after the September 11 coup, 18.53% occurred between 1974 and 
 
240 Ricardo Colombres et al., “Nunca Más” (Buenos Aires: Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, 
1984), http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/index2.htm. 
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August 1977, and 12.90% occurred after 1977 until the end of the dictatorship—shown in Figure 
14.244  
 
Figure 14: Total detentions by percentage: 34,698 detentions considered; 28,459 victims considered (Valech Report) 
 The data from the various sources aligns with the first hypothesis that higher levels of 
atrocities and violations will result in more justice. As both countries experienced massive 
human rights violations that spanned nearly the entire dictatorships, the existence of trials in both 
countries aligns with the hypothesis. Figure 12 demonstrates the slightly worse human rights 
situation in Argentina than in Chile and as Argentina had trials to prosecute the perpetrators 
within the first years after its dictatorship—faster than in Chile—and has had a larger quantity 
further strengthens the validity of the first hypothesis. In other words, the severity of human 
rights violations motivates justice, in timing of trials and quantity of convictions. 
 
 
 
 
244 Sergio Valech et al. 
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Hypothesis 2: Type of Transition  
 The second hypothesis relies on scholarly analysis of history. As demonstrated during the 
timelines of each country, the Argentine Junta experienced a transition by collapse as a result of 
both internal—division between the branches of the military, increase in number and strength of 
human rights movements, an economic crisis—and external—the loss of the Falkland Islands 
War—factors. Whereas in Chile, on the other hand, Pinochet negotiated his transition from 
power through the 1980 Constitution and its subsequent 1988 plebiscite. The devastated 
Argentine dictators therefore remained without power and protection, making trials easier in the 
beginning of its transitionary phase. With Pinochet retaining some power and influence over the 
military, judicial, and legislative bodies, the new government faced more tribulations to try the 
perpetrators in Chile immediately after the end of the dictatorship. This factor, however, does not 
explain the longevity of transitional justice as Chile had successful trials and prosecutions. 
Therefore, as the second hypothesis emphasizes, immediate actions for justice will occur in 
countries that suffered a transition by collapse and not negotiation; however, it cannot predict 
justice in the long term. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Legal Status  
 Judicial independence can highlight the type of legal status in a country because it 
demonstrates the availability of the system and its connection to the departing dictatorship. CIRI 
codifies such a measure and demonstrates the legacy of the dictatorships in the judicial system. 
This measure directly applies to after the dictatorship. After the Argentine dictatorship, 
Argentina has largely had a partially independent system except for in 1985-1986 and 1988-1989 
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with a generally independent judiciary.245 Chile’s judiciary, however, has become more 
independent over time. Immediately after the end of the dictatorship, the country had a partially 
independent system, except for 1994; this changed in 2000 when it became generally 
independent.246 Figure 15 displays this comparison.  
Argentina faced a generally independent legal system in the beginning of its democracy, 
with a separation of undue military/dictatorial influence and the law, which could account for the 
existence of trials against perpetrators. However, this plateaued and even decreased as the 
dictatorship moved farther into history. Chile, on the other hand, did not have this separation for 
at least 10 years after the end of the dictatorship, which aligns with the timeline of the most 
important trials against the perpetrators of violations.  
 
Figure 15: Judicial Independence Scores (David Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay) 
Other groups have research judicial independence, including TJRC. The judicial 
independence measure from TJRC follows Keith’s dataset, which has an emphasis on de facto 
independence. Figure 16 shows similar data to that of Figure 15 with certain key information. 
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For Argentina, figure 16 shows a similar fluctuation between 1984 and 1990 to that of Figure 15; 
how the scores do not plateau as partially independent until 1994. The period between 1992 and 
1996 shows Chile did not have an independent judiciary in Figure 16 while it had a partially 
independent system in Figure 15. This difference likely corresponds to the emphasis on de facto 
independence, as the Chilean judiciary still had many members of Pinochet’s regime in power 
and the new judiciary policies emerged in 1997.  
 
Figure 16: Keith Judicial Independence Scores (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative) 
 The last measure of judicial independence comes from Linzer and Staton, rating the 
countries from 0 to 1 (Figure 17). This paper emphasizes that scores around 0.8 represent 
generally independent judiciaries. Therefore, Figure 17 highlights the fluctuation of Argentine 
judiciary independence as seen in the previous two figures that levelled off at partially 
independent around 1990 as well as shows the increase in independence immediately after the 
end of the dictatorship (1983-1986). Chile, however, exits its dictatorial period partially 
independent and slowly becomes more independent over time, as the legacy of Pinochet 
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diminishes with each passing year of democracy and democratic policies until 2000 when it 
becomes generally independent—all of which mirrors the information in the prior two figures. 
 
Figure 17: Judicial Independence Scores (Linzer-Staton) 
 The data appears to confirm the third hypothesis that a continuous legal structure where 
the former dictators maintain power and influence on the judiciary system have slower justice 
policies than a system without such influence. It took Chile nearly 10 years after the end of the 
dictatorship to have a generally independent judiciary that could hold fair and impartial trials 
against the Junta. Despite lower levels of independence seen in Figure 17, Argentina had a 
generally independent judiciary immediately following the collapse of the dictatorship. This 
paper emphasizes that other attributes besides dictatorial legacy impact the degree of judicial 
independence and notes that Argentina has a consistently partially independent system likely due 
to its history or political instability.247   
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Hypothesis 4: Role of Executive  
 As noted earlier, the independence of the judiciary impacts the autonomy and authority of 
the executive. This section will consider the data and information presented in the above section 
in addition to data from Polity IV that discusses executive constraint. Figure 18 demonstrates the 
degree of executive constraints in the final years of the dictatorships to 2018. A score of one 
represents the dictatorial period. Argentina faced many challenges. Immediately after the end of 
the dictatorship, Polity IV finds executive parity in the country, but this fluctuates to scores of 5 
and 6, meaning substantial and intermediate equality, until 2016.248 After the 1988 plebiscite, 
Chile rises which connotes the beginning of change and then the country spikes into executive 
parity in 1989 when the first democratic elections occurred.  
 
Figure 18: Executive Constraints (Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers) 
This information supports the fourth hypothesis when combined with the level of judicial 
independence seen above. The level of constraints represents the concentration of authority of 
the president; therefore, a higher score equates to lower levels of authority. According to the 
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fourth hypothesis, more authority and decision-making autonomy in the executive will allow for 
more transitional justice, as the military—or other accountability groups—can exert undue 
influence and alter justice policies. An independent judiciary acts as an accountability group and, 
therefore, can work in tandem with an equal executive branch to exert justice. 
Immediately after the end of the dictatorship, Argentina had an independent judiciary and 
executive parity; however, both began to waver in the long term as the legal system had partial 
independence and the executive had more authority, a sign of its historical political instability. 
Argentina’s executive constraint scores, therefore, would lead one to assume less success with 
transitional justice policies. However, unlike the Polity IV scores that do not name the 
accountability groups placing constraints on the executive, this paper assumes that the 
independent judiciary during this time period acts as the constraint as the military did not have 
the power to do so. This allows for a higher level of decision-making autonomy in the executive, 
as the legal system would not interfere as an independent body. Argentina therefore lands in the 
B square of Figure 1 from Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux with high levels of decision-making 
autonomy and low levels of authority. The pattern of justice follows as well; Argentina had a 
high influx of trials against perpetrators in the beginning years, but that tapered off as the 
judiciary became less independent—autonomy decreased—and the authority of the executive 
faltered. 
This thesis contends that the stability of Chilean scores in Figure 18 suffers from the 
inability to decipher the accountability groups exercising constraints on the executive. The 
history of the country and its judicial independence scores, however, allow for the paper to 
deduce the military as the accountability group for the first decade after the dictatorship. This 
constraint greatly differs from an independent legal system constraint as those aligned with the 
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dictatorship face prosecution from transitional justice policies and would, consequentially, 
oppose such actions. Therefore, the low level of authority of the Chilean executive and low level 
of decision-making autonomy due to the influence of the post-dictatorial regime in positions of 
power, Chile did not have many successful justice policies in the beginning of its democracy, as 
in quadrant D of Figure 1. While the country did initiate the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission during this time, its publication Nunca Más described its shortcomings as a result of 
destroyed or withheld information. 
Overall, the combination of judicial independence and the level of authority and 
autonomy of the executives in both Argentina and Chile align with the fourth hypothesis: higher 
levels of autonomy and authority of the executive allow for greater success in justice policies.  
 
Hypothesis 5: International Pressure  
 Along with information presented in the timelines of each country, specifically the role of 
Spain and the United Kingdom in a trial against Pinochet, international organizations’ actions in 
a given country demonstrate international pressure. Human rights organizations like the United 
Nations, Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) act as pillars for the transnational advocacy networks 
that join the efforts of individuals, civil society groups, NGOs, and non-profit organizations to 
advocate for change.  
 The UN has issued reports on both countries from various sectors of the organization. 
Some examples about Argentina include “Question of the human rights of all persons subjected 
to any form of detention or imprisonment, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” by the Special Rapporteur, Nigel S. Rodly, to the 
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Commission on Human Rights and Security Council Resolution 502 that urges Argentina to 
withdraw from the Falkland Islands. As for Chile, the UN, from the General Assembly to the 
Economic and Social Council, has issued around 60 resolutions and decisions regarding the 
dictatorship and the human rights system in the country beginning in 1974 and continuing into 
the 2000s.  
The first action from AI in Argentina occurred when a delegation visited the country in 
November 1976 and issued a report discussed above. The organization continues with its reports 
and activism regarding the Argentine dictatorship, periodically issuing reports on the topic and 
the human rights abuses present. Similarly, AI issued its first report on Chile in 1974, which 
discusses Allende and the Junta, focusing on the human rights abuses occurring as a result of the 
dictatorship.249 AI continued to issue reports and campaigns that addressed the human rights 
abuses, specifically torture and disappearances, until 2008. The first HRW reports on both 
Argentina and Chile came out in 1991. HRW has issued few reports on either country relating to 
the dictatorships, with the last in 2001 for Argentina and 2005 for Chile. The PTS also helps 
articulate the amount and frequency of reports from AI and HRW as well as the U.S. State 
Reports. As the PTS began in 1976, it has scores for both countries from AI and U.S. State 
reports but not for HRW. Further, the IACHR issued its first country report on Argentina in 
1980, with its first visit in 1976, and on Chile in 1975 after a 1974 visit. The IACHR issued other 
reports on the countries, discussing the human rights concerns in each. 
 The largest amount of international pressure exerted on either country occurred between 
1996 and 2000 when Spain and the United Kingdom worked in tandem to prosecute Pinochet. 
This experience demonstrated to Chile, and the global community, the impact of a strong, united 
 
249 Amnesty International, ed., Chile: An Amnesty International Report (London: Amnesty International 
Publications, 1974). 
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exiled community as well as the strength of universal jurisdiction. It greatly incentivized Chile to 
begin its own investigations and trials as the world learned about the heinousness of the 
dictatorship and pleaded for justice. The data regarding involvement of international 
organizations demonstrates that these reports existed since the beginning of the dictatorships, 
highlighting the human rights violations and calling for a change; therefore, their impact on 
justice remains unclear. The case of Chile provides an example of the impact of international 
pressure on domestic enforcement, meaning the fifth hypothesis has merit; however, the strength 
of transnational advocacy networks on exerting this positive force requires further investigation.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Diffusion Theory  
 The geographical proximity and many cultural similarities, specifically a common 
language and religion, makes Argentina and Chile an excellent case study of the efficacy and 
validity of the diffusion theory. According to the timelines of each country and data presented 
above, Argentina had trials within the first years after the end of the dictatorship, while domestic 
Chilean trials did not occur until many years into the democracy. This would imply that trials 
existed in Argentina many years before Chile. One could then postulate that the success of the 
trials in condemning perpetrators and relieving the society of this weight influenced Chile. 
Figure 19 shows the percentage of countries in the region that had prosecutions in each year. As 
mentioned earlier, all of the Southern Cone countries and many other South American countries 
suffered from dictatorships during a similar time period. All of these countries transitioned to 
democracy before Chile, so the diffusion theory accounts for not just the impact of Argentina on 
its neighbor but also the other geographically proximate and culturally similar countries in the 
region. Figure 19 data confirms diffusion theory because the percentage increases over time, 
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implying that more countries within the region used trials in their transitional justice policies. 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 demonstrate that successful prosecutions (meaning those that resulted in 
guilty verdicts) began in Argentina before Chile; therefore, following the diffusion theory, this 
paper argues that Argentina, and other countries with prosecutions throughout the region, 
influenced Chile to adopt similar policies. 
 
Figure 19: Regional Prosecutions (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative) 
In conclusion, Table 5 articulates the validity of the hypotheses according to the data 
presented. 
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Table 5: Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis 1: Severity of Violence Confirmed: Severe human rights abuses result in 
justice policies with more heinous case (Argentina) 
having prosecutions sooner. 
Hypothesis 2: Type of Transition Confirmed: Transitions that result from collapse 
will take more immediate transitional justice 
policies than those with a pacted transition; 
however, this cannot predict long-term responses. 
Hypothesis 3: Legal Status Confirmed: A continuous legal structure where the 
former dictatorial regime maintains power and 
influence over the judiciary will have fewer and less 
successful justice policies in the short-term.   
Hypothesis 4: Role of executive Confirmed: High levels of executive autonomy and 
authority allow for greater success in justice 
policies. 
Hypothesis 5: International Pressure  Mixed results: International pressure can advocate 
for and influence countries to execute justice 
policies; however, the specific impact of 
transnational advocacy networks on incentivization 
requires more research. 
Hypothesis 6: Diffusion Theory  Confirmed: The diffusion theory can account for 
trials flowing from one geographically proximate 
and/or culturally similar country to another given 
success in the primary.  
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CONCLUSION 
“We know that peace is only possible when it is the fruit of justice. True peace is a profound 
transformation by means of the force of nonviolence that is the power of love.” 
(Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Survivor and 1980 Nobel Peace Prize Recipient) 
 This thesis has analyzed possible explanatory variables for varying responses to human 
rights abuses caused by dictatorships, using Argentina and Chile as case studies. It finds that 1) 
the severity of violence during the dictatorships, 2) the type of transition, 3) the legal structure, 
4) the role of the executive, and 5) diffusion theory explain the justice policies in the short and 
long-term. International pressure has influenced these policies as well; however, more data must 
exist to determine the extent of its sway.  
 Argentina and Chile had interestingly different responses—both in policy and society—to 
the grave dictatorships in their respective countries; however, this paper begins the analysis to 
explain the structural differences, with a focus on the existence of trials against the perpetrators 
of the abuses. The first democratic government of Argentina could implement trials quickly 
because of the heinousness of the violations by the Junta, the collapse of the dictatorial regime, 
the restored legal structure with high levels of judicial independence in the first democratic 
years, and high levels of executive authority. Argentina’s transitional justice policies declined for 
many years because the political situation changed, and the country began to separate itself from 
its past. Chile had an opposite approach. The beginning years of its democracy remained in the 
shadow of Pinochet’s presence as he maintained power in the judiciary, legislature, and military. 
The country began most of its transitional justice policies after the first decade of democracy, 
when the judiciary gained independence, other countries in the region had begun to implement 
prosecutions, and the international community nearly prosecuted Pinochet in Europe. With both 
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dictatorships 30 years in the past, Chile appears to have recovered more stability in these 
political measures, specifically judicial independence and executive constraints; however, this 
paper contends that the tumultuous Argentine history continues to impact the political stability in 
the country and such a history does not exist in Chile. 
 This paper, however, does not end the study on the differences of Argentina and Chile 
with respect to their responses to the dictatorship. Many societal differences exist as well, 
especially in terms of public opinion and attitude towards the military regimes. Therefore, a 
future study could analyze the societal perceptions of the dictatorships and the transitional justice 
policies enacted as well as the process of memorialization. Furthermore, the dictatorship 
impacted different groups of people in drastically different ways, so this paper recommends an 
analysis of the dictatorial effect on minorities, specifically the multitude of indigenous 
populations in both countries.  
 Many countries have suffered from dictatorships and mass human rights abuses, making 
this thesis widely applicable to the global community. However, this thesis should provide as one 
example within a broader scholarly body to evaluate the variables that impact transitional justice 
policies. Further, scholars can utilize this thesis as a baseline to potentially predict the outcomes 
of countries currently undergoing dictatorships or transitions to democracy. Despite the focus on 
two countries, its findings expand past the Southern Cone and South America to the international 
arena. 
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